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Abstract
Measuring individuals’ preferences for goods and services has recently ob-
tained considerable attention in both public and private contexts. Individu-
als’ judgments are used for many different purposes, including setting social
policies and forecating the acceptance of a new product in the market. While
preference modeling is a long-studying problem, modern applications, related
to the web, make it an actual topic. Respondents are called to express their
preferences among a set of alternatives and collected data can be represented
in various kinds of matrices. This thesis is focused on some popular meth-
ods to estimate either scores or ranks of a set of alternatives by analyzing
a generalized tournament matrix. The proposed methods are compared via
simulation and some special situations are investigated to detect their relia-
bility. Our aim is to compare methods that assume parametric hypotheses on
data distribution with methods that do not require such hypotheses. When
respondents do not compare directly two alternatives, the matrix represent-
ing their preferences may show one or more missing values. We propose a
method to estimate the missing entries of a generalized tournament matrix
based on the minimization of the sum of its singular values, i.e. the nuclear
norm. We perform some simulation studies to investigate the nuclear norm
minimization effectiveness.

Sommario
Conoscere le opinioni e le preferenze degli individui su beni o servizi, ha da
sempre rivestito notevole importanza, in contesti sia pubblici che privati. Le
preferenze delle persone vengono, infatti, rilevate per diversi scopi, come il
definire nuove politiche sociali o il valutare se un nuovo prodotto potra` essere
recepito sul mercato. Le applicazioni moderne dell’analisi delle preferenze,
connesse al web, lo rendono un argomento attuale. Il punto di partenza
l’espressione da parte di un campione di individui delle proprie preferenze
in merito alle possibili alternative di un insieme. I criteri per rilevare le
preferenze sono numerosi. In questa tesi si presentano alcuni metodi per
stimare i punteggi o i ranghi delle alternative partendo da un matrice con
struttura di rilevazione a torneo generalizzata. Vengono realizzate alcune
simulazioni allo scopo di confrontare i metodi proposti e di investigare alcune
situazioni particolari utili a verificarne la affidabilita`. L’obiettivo della tesi e`
di confrontare metodi che assumono ipotesi parametriche sulla distribuzione
dei dati e metodi che non richiedono ipotesi. Nella tesi, inoltre, si propone
un metodo per stimare un dato non validamente espresso in una matrice di
torneo generalizzata. Il metodo si basa sulla minimizzazione della somma dei
valori singolari, vale a dire la norma nucleare, della stessa matrice. Inoltre,
sono effettuate simulazioni allo scopo di analizzare l’efficacia del metodo di
stima basato sulla minimizzazione della norma nucleare.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Preference elicitation is a common issue in many different disciplines, such as
economics, sociology, political science and psychology. To elicit preferences,
groups of individuals are called to express their preferences among a set of
alternatives. While preference modeling is a long studying problem, modern
applications, related to the web, make it an actual topic.
There are several methods to elicit preferences: ordering the alternatives,
picking up one or more out of them, rating the alternatives, allocating a
budget among them and comparing them in pairs (Fabbris, 2011). According
to the latter method, alternatives are presented in pairs to one or more judges,
in a random sequence (Kendall & Babington-Smith, 1940). The judge can
choose either one, declare a tie, or express his or her preference on some scale.
The method of paired comparisons presents some advantages with respect
the other tecniques, since most people cannot evaluate many alternatives at
a time. Moreover, in case of very similar alternatives, compare them in pairs
helps to express a preference.
The data, collected through all methods can be represented, sometimes after
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a pre-treatment, in a generalized tournament matrix P , defined as follows
(Moon & Pullman, 1970).
Let A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak} be a set of k alternatives, P = [piij] is a (k × k)
matrix that satisfies
P + P T = J − I, P ≥ 0.
In this case piij represents the probability that Ai is preferred to Aj and it
can be estimated through pij, the proportion of comparisons in which Ai is
preferred to Aj, provided there are no ties. Hence, pij = 1/2 indicates indif-
ference between Ai and Aj, pij = 1 indicates that Ai is always preferred to
Aj and pij > 1/2 indicates that Ai is preferred to Aj.
Another kind of matrix, widely used in literature (Saaty, 1977, 2008), is the
multiplicative paired comparison matrix M = [mij] in which mij ∈ ]0, c[
represents the preference ratio of Ai over Aj: mij > 1 implies that Ai is
strictly preferred to Aj, whereas mij < 1 expresses the opposite preference
and mij = 1 means indifference.
Starting from a generalized tournament matrix P it is possible to construct a
ranking of the alternatives or to define a set of weights that reflects their rel-
ative importance. There are several methods in literature for these purposes
such as the score-vector (Kendall, 1955; David, 1987; Thurstone, 1927b), the
eigenvector method (Kendall, 1955; Wei, 1952) and the linear models (David,
1988).
The score vector ω(1) is the vector of row sums obtained by
ω(1) = P · e
where e is a column vector of all 1’s. According to this method the alterna-
tives are ranked in the corresponding order. For a generalized tournament
matrix the i-th row sum can be interpreted as the expected score of Ai.
The eigenvector method is based on the eigenvalues and eigenvectors asso-
ciated to the generalized tournament matrix. Suppose P is a positive irre-
ducible matrix, then the Perron-Frobenius theorem guarantees the existence
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of an unique large real eigenvalue λ1 as solution of the characteristic equation
Pω = λ1ω
whose eigenvector ω has strictly positive components (Keener, 1993). ω is
a unique solution of the characteristic equation provided ‖ω‖2 = 1. Its i-th
entry is assumed to represent the relative importance of the i-th alternative
with respect to the others.
The linear paired comparison model (David, 1988) assumes that the k al-
ternatives can be represented along a linear continuum. Each of them has
true rating Vi which determines its position in such representation. The rat-
ing of the i-th item will vary from respondent to respondent and it may be
represented by Yi a continuous variable with mean Vi and distribution called
“sensation distribution”.
The Yi’s (i = 1, . . . , k) are independent and identically distributed variables
with the same variance. Defining Zi = Yi − Vi, we have that Zi − Zj is a
symmetric variable with mean 0 and distribution, named defining distribu-
tion, that depends on the distribution of Yi.
Under these assumptions, the probability of preferring Ai to Aj can be ex-
pressed as follows
piij = FZi−Zj(Vi − Vj) (i, j = 1, . . . , k)
Hence, to estimate the ratings Vi’s, we have to solve the linear system
dij = Vˆi − Vˆj = F−1Zi−Zj(pij)
with k unknown parameters and k(k − 1) equations. If k > 3 the system
results overdetermined and we need to impose some contraints to solve it.
Among the others, the Thurstone & Mosteller model (Thurstone, 1927a;
Mosteller, 1951), assumes that variables Zi − Zj have a normal distribution
and the Bradley & Terry model, assumes a logistic distrubution (Bradley &
Terry, 1952).
Suppose now that the generalized tournament matrix P is incomplete, that
is some of its entries are unknown. This happens for different reasons: for
4 Introduction
example, if the number of alternatives is large and it is not possible to submit
all the possible pairs to the respondents. The topic of missing values in a
preference matrix has been extensively discussed in literature (Harker, 1987;
Carmone et al., 1997; Kwiesielewicz & Van Uden, 2003; Fedrizzi & Giove,
2007; Dittrich et al., 2012).
When a respondent does not compare directly two alternatives, Ai and Aj,
the linear models permit to estimate the preference relation between them
using the information achieved from their comparison with a shared alterna-
tive Al. In practice, linear models allow to obtain pij through pil and plj for
i, j, l = 1, . . . , k and i 6= j 6= l. In particular, if we assume that F−1(p) exists
and is unique for p ∈ (0, 1) then (Latta, 1979)
pij = Pr (Yi ≥ Yj) = F (Vi − Vj)
= F (Vi − Vl + Vl − Vj)
= F [F−1(pil) + F−1(plj)].
1.2 Main Contributions of the Thesis
In this thesis we compare the above-introduced methods proposed for rank-
ing and scoring a set of alternatives. Starting from a generalized tournament
matrix P , the comparison is performed via simulation and some special sit-
uations are investigated to detect the reliability of the methods. The aim
is to compare methods based on distributional parametric hypotheses with
methods that do not require such hypotheses.
When respondents do not compare directly two alternatives, the matrix des-
ignated to represent their preferences is characterized by one or more missing
values. In this thesis, we propose a method to estimate the missing proba-
bilities of a generalized tournament matrix P based only on its valid entries.
The main assumption is that only a few dimensions contribute to individual
preferences, which corresponds to state that P can be well approximated by
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a lower-rank matrix. So, we search for the matrix completion that minimizes
its rank; intuitively, we seek for the simplest completion values that fit the
observed data. Since rank minimization problems result to be unsolvable, it
is possible to use a recent heuristic that minimizes the sum of the singular
values, i.e. the nuclear norm (Fazel et al., 2001).
In literature there are articles on matrix completion based on the minimiza-
tion of the nuclear norm (Cande`s & Recht, 2009; Gleich & Lim, 2011), es-
pecially for lower-than-full rank matrices, whereas generalized tournament
matrices are of full rank.
Finally, we perform some simulation studies to compare nuclear norm mini-
mization with linears model composition rules.
This thesis consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2 we present a general
background on preference modeling, in particular on elicitation preference
methods. The main focus is on the paired comparison method and on the
matrices used to represent paired comparison preference data. Chapter 3
describes some methods for ranking or scoring alternatives. In Chapter 4 we
present the results of the simulation studies to compare the proposed rank-
ing and scoring methods. Chapter 5 is focused on the estimation of missing
values within a generalized tournament matrix. Thus composition rules as-
sociated to linear models are presented and a procedure based on the nuclear
norm minimization is investigated. In Chapter 6 some concluding remarks
are drawn.

Chapter 2
Background
Measuring individuals’ preferences for goods and services has recently ob-
tained considerable importance for both public and private contexts as a key
element in the decision-making process. Individuals’ judgments are used for
many different purposes, including setting social policies and evaluating the
acceptance of a new product in the market. To give some examples, elicit-
ing public preferences for healthcare results to be fundamental in allocating
resources across competing services. Indeed, given the limited availability
of resources, public opinions are recognized to be a fundamental criterion
for their allocation (Kassirer, 1994; Ryan et al., 2001). Another application
comes from electronic commerce. To increase business success and customer
loyalty it is necessary to offer consumers personalized services. To this end, it
is essential to understand individual customers’ preferences for products and
recommend them the most appropriate ones (Schafer et al., 2001; Devaraj
et al., 2002). Therefore, politicians want to know voters’ opinions; companies
want to know consumers’ preferences and people in general wants to know
what others think about political, social, health and other issues.
There are two main paths to eliciting preferences: either from stated or from
revealed preference analysis (Train, 2003). Stated preferences are choices
that individuals would make from a hypothetical choice set. So, if we want
respondents to state their preferences, we can simply ask them. There is
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a slight difference between choice and preference. Indeed, a choice applies
to expressions such “I choose that option” while a preference applies to “I
prefer this instead of that” (Fabbris, 2013). However, in this thesis the two
terms are used without distinctions because our analyses apply to both.
Revealed preferences, on the other hand, are implicit in individuals’ choice
actions. To reveal respondents’ preferences, we have to observe their actual
choice behaviors. For example, if in a survey we ask a respondent which car
he would buy among a set of three cars, we are eliciting his stated prefer-
ences. On the other hand, if we ask him which car he bought when he last
bought a car, we are revealing his preferences.
Economists generally prefer to analyze revealed preferences. Psychologists
and other social scientists, instead, use mainly stated preference data. In the
following, we refer to stated preferences.
Questionnaires represent the principal mean to collect individuals’ opinions
and preferences. Before expressing their preferences among a fixed set of k
alternatives individuals have to do some mental exercises. First of all they are
implicitely required to create in their own mind a measurement scale based
on their values and social rules. Then, they try to put the alternatives, also
called items or stimuli, on the derived ordinal or cardinal scale and, finally,
they express their choices. During this process respondents may encounter
difficulties. Sometimes, for example, they cannot express a preference among
two alternatives, as they are too similar, or they may not be able to construct
a measurement scale because the question put has no real meaning to them.
Preference data collected from n sample units can be used to estimate either
scores or ranks for the alternatives in the choice set. Ranking procedures
simply return the alternatives in order of importance. Scoring techniques,
instead, assign values to the alternatives, according to a convenient scale.
Ranks can be adopted to define priorities among the choice set, to show hi-
erarchies among items, or to point out if an alternative improves its position
with respect to a previous ranking. Scores may be of interest when quanti-
tative and precise values are needed, for instance, to allot resources among
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the units of the choice set (Fabbris, 2013).
2.1 Methods for Eliciting the Preferences
The questions used to elicit preferences are usually closed questions, with
predetermined answers, and respondents express their preferences within the
given set. There are several techniques apt to elicit preferences among a
fixed set of alternatives. We will examine the following techniques, trying to
emphasize their strengths and weaknesses: ranking, picking the best alterna-
tive, rating, partitioning a constant sum among alternatives and comparing
alternatives in pairs.
2.1.1 Ranking
According to this method, respondents are asked to rank the alternatives
in order of importance. The problem with this method, however, is that
the more numerous the alternatives in the choice set, the more difficult it
is for the respondent to answer (Inglehart & Abramson, 1993). Indeed, this
procedure requires that each respondent evaluates all the items of the set
simultaneously. Ties may be allowed if the researcher perceives that the task
required is too difficult for respondents (Fabbris, 2013).
A typical ranking question asks the respondent to attribute to each of the
k alternatives a number from 1, for the most preferred alternative, to k, for
the least preferred one (See Fig. 2.1).
2.1.2 Pick Up one or more Alternatives
Respondents can be asked to select their one or two most preferred alter-
natives out of the list. This method requires an effort similar but not as
extensive as the ranking technique. This is the simplest way for respondents
to express their preference concerning a set of alternatives. However, no
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Figure 2.1: Ranking question example
information regarding the relationship among the non-selected alternatives
is derived (Sato, 2004). This method is simple and fast, even in presence
of many alternatives. Among the ones we present, picking up one or more
alternatives is the procedure most similar to choice.
Fig. 2.2 shows a possible question of this type, always referred to the example
presented in Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.2: Picking question example
2.1.3 Rating
According to this method, respondents are asked to rate each alternative
using a vote from 1 to a fixed number. Ideally, a rating scale should consist
of enough points to extract the necessary information. Odd numbers of
points have generally been preferred to even numbers because they allow
the middle category to be interpreted as a neutral point. In a literature
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Figure 2.3: Amazon rating system
review, Cox (1980) concluded that there is no single number of points for
a rating scale that is appropriate for all situations. Some researchers claim
that scales consisting of three points are sufficient (Matell & Jacoby, 1971).
However, a 5 option system results often better than a 3 option system, since
it makes possible more accurate predictions (Churchill et al., 1984). For
instance, the five points scale is the most used method in web applications
like Amazon (See Fig. 2.3), Youtube or Netflix. Friedman and Friedman
(1986) concluded that researchers should consider using anywhere from 5-
to 11-point scales. A rating scale can be either unipolar or bipolar. Rating
alternatives method is not particularly affected by the increasing size of the
choice set and it presents the advantage that the scores can be treated roughly
like cardinal measurements. It is characterized by low discriminatory power,
indeed it leads to less differentiation among items, with the possibility that
a respondent rates every item identically.
2.1.4 Constant Sum Question
Another possibility to elicit preferences is to ask respondents to allocate a
budget across the given set of alternatives, up to a cumulative maximum
number of points, usually 100. These points are distributed so as to reflect
the relative importance of the alternatives, revealing the relative difference
between them. Figure 2.4 is a scheme of a question of this kind.
A constant sum question may be useful to differentiate the preference on
the alternatives. Moreover, it allows respondents to assign 0 importance to
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Figure 2.4: Constant sum question
items, which is not possible in other preference elicitation methods. This
method is not reccomended in case of a large choice set, since it requires
long time and large mental energy from respondents. A computer-assisted
interviewing system allows to check the sum of points cumulated after each
assignment (Fabbris, 2013). Conrad et al. (2005) found that running totals
improve the likelihood to reach the desired sum and take the respondents
less time.
2.1.5 Paired Comparisons
In the method of paired comparisons, the k alternatives are presented in
pairs to respondents (Kendall & Babington-Smith, 1940). To control the
order effect, it is important to randomize the presentation order of the pairs
as well as the order of items within each pair (Bock & Jones, 1968). This is
the reason why computer-assisted interviewing systems promoted the use of
paired comparisons methods.
According to this procedure, a judge can choose either one, declare a tie,
or express his or her preference on some scale. The situation in which ev-
ery respondent performs every possible paired comparison is called “balanced
paired-comparison experiment” and corresponds, in sports terms, to a Round
Robin Tournament (David, 1988).
Thanks to the paired comparisons method, it is possible to elicit preferences
based on an attribute that can only be subjective as taste. The judgement
process is simplified, since respondents have to judge a pair of objects at a
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time. Especially when differences between choice alternatives are small, these
methods provide more information with respect to rating methods, since the
paired comparison between the alternatives is as free as possible from ex-
traneous influence. Moreover, it is possible to identify respondents with not
well-defined preferences, through internal consistency checks. If respondents
are consistent in their judgments, the researcher can have much greater con-
fidence in them also for further applications.
The main problem of paired comparison method is that every respondent has
to compare, for k alternatives, k(k−1)/2 distinct pairs of items. For this rea-
son, if k is large, reduced forms of paired comparisons are available, as the
incomplete tournament technique proposed by Fabbris and Fabris (2003).
This procedure involves ordering the alternatives according to a criterion,
submitting for choice firstly the k/2 pairs of adjacent alternatives, then the
k/4 pairs of alternatives preferred at the first level and so on until the most
preferred alternative is sorted out.
The literature on paired comparison modeling is vast and spans various fields.
In the following we give some references on the origins of this popular method.
Paired comparisons techniques have been widely used by psychometricians.
The method was introduced by Fechner (1860; 1966), a German experimen-
tal psychologist, who firstly described and implemented the concept of paired
comparisons in his book “Elemente der Psychophysik”. Fechner suggested
that choice behavior can be considered as a probabilistic phenomenon, since
there exists a probability that a person makes a choice rather than another.
Moreover, he stated that this probability may not equal 1 or 0, as it is often
observed that a person repeatedly presented with the same pair of alterna-
tives will not always make the same choice.
Paired comparisons method was made popular by L.L. Thurstone (1927a),
a prominent psychometrician, who first introduced a scientific approach to
using pairwise comparisons for measurement. In its paper “The law of com-
parative judgment” he provided a method for ordering alternatives along
a continuum (Edwards, 1983). As Fechner, Thurstone (1927c) considered
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choice behavior to be a probabilistic rather than a deterministic process; he
used the normal distribution to estimate the model parameters. A judge may
provide different judgements about the same object on different occasions;
that is, the judgment process does not always provide the same value on a
psychological continuum (Luce, 1959). Although Thurstone focused initially
on paired comparisons, he recognized later that many other types of choice
data, including rankings, could be modeled in a similar way.
Mosteller (1951) considered and extended Thurstone’s model, focusing on a
particular case, i.e. the fifth law of comparative judgments of Thurstone’s
list. The Bradley & Terry model (Bradley & Terry, 1952) was obtained from
the Thurstone & Mosteller model substituting the normal distribution with
the logistic function.
The literature on the method of paired comparisons has grown over the years
and several extensive reviews on method of paired comparisons are now avail-
able (Coombs, 1958; Torgerson, 1958; Bock & Jones, 1968; Kendall, 1970).
Several applications have been in sensory testing, consumer testing, personnel
rating (David, 1988), chess ranking (Joe, 1990), sports tournaments (Chan,
2011) and image quality assessment (Handley, 2001).
2.2 Utilities and Preferences
To describe consumers choices, marketing researchers extended to an econo-
metric context paired comparison models introduced by Thurstone (McFad-
den, 1980; Manski & McFadden, 1981; Berry, 1994). McFadden was one of
the researchers that made these models popular. In his original work on the
San Francisco transit system he used a probabilistic choice model to analyze
individual’s decisions to use various modes of transport such as car, train,
carpooling and bus (McFadden, 1974).
Econometric models of probabilistic choice, also called random utility mod-
els, assume that choice is a discrete event. Consumers, indeed, cannot leave
the supermarket with one half of Coke or one half of Pepsi but they will
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tend to leave with a full can of the chosen brand. Moreover, models assume
that the utility of a brand varies across individuals as a random variable.
Finally, individuals are supposed to be rational agents who make the choice
that possesses the highest utility. So, considering the case of a choice among
two alternatives Ai and Aj, an individual will choose object Ai over object
Aj if the utility of Ai is greater than utility of Aj, that is if Ui > Uj. Dis-
cussion here is in terms of individual utility but similar reasoning applies to
collective choices. The choice between two alternatives reflects paired com-
parison models assumptions but random utility models have been extended
to choice among many possibilities: the preferred alternative is the one with
the highest utility.
Random utility models can be used to describe the relationship between the
outcome, the choice, and some explanatory variables, such as tastes or per-
sonal characteristics.
The utility, for individual h, of alternative Aj, Uhj, is composed from an
observed part, as some known attribute for example its monetary cost, and
an unobserved one, that is everything else that is not specified in the utility.
Formally, utility is given by
Uhj = Vhj + Ehj
where Vhj is the observed part and Ehj is the error term. The assumptions
about the distribution of the error allow the researcher to specify a density
function to estimate the otherwise hidden term. Depending on the assumed
distribution on the utilities, we have different classes of random utility mod-
els.
2.3 Pairwise Comparisons: Inconsistencies
Let us consider the simplest case in which three alternatives Ai, Aj and Al
are compared in pairs: if the respondent creates a continuum in his mind
internally consistent then he expresses transitive preferences over those al-
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ternatives. Assuming ties are not allowed, if the respondent prefers Ai to Al
and Al to Aj then transitivity implies that Ai is preferred to Aj (Fig. 2.5 a).
In this case the three alternatives can be ranked from first to third as follows:
Ai, Al and Aj. Conversely, intransitive preferences occur when, for instance,
the respondent prefers Ai to Al and Al to Aj but Aj to Ai (Fig. 2.5 b).
Transitive preferences allow to position the alternatives along a linear con-
tinuum which expresses the dominance relations among them. A condition
of complete transitivity is difficult to obtain in practice, especially measuring
preferences on a set with a large number of alternatives. On the other hand,
intransitivities occur when the items cannot be listed in a strict hierarchy,
as it happens when alternatives are preferred the same proportion of times.
Intransitivities are called also inconsistencies, or circular triads, since they
produce a loop on preferences in which each alternative is preferred to each
other including itself (Kendall & Babington-Smith, 1940).
Figure 2.5: Preferences relationships among three alternatives
i
l j
(a) Transitive relationships
i
l j
(b) Intransitive relationships
Intransitivities may stem from either the incompetence of the respondent or
the high similarity among the alternatives, or both. Another possible expla-
nation is that the respondent evaluates the alternatives based on more than
one dimension and he cannot order them on a linear scale (David, 1988).
The concept of consistency presented in this section is referred to as inter-
nal consistency, which is different from that of agreement between a set of
respondents or between a respondent and a true ranking, which are named
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rater agreement or external consistency.
Paired comparison experiments, unlike the other preference elicitation meth-
ods, allow researchers to identify respondents with inconsistent preferences.
Researchers may decide to consider whether or not preferences elicited from
these respondents.
2.4 Data Structure
Given a finite set of alternatives A = (A1, A2, . . . , Ak) with k ≥ 2, respon-
dents are called to express their preferences comparing them in pairs. Con-
sider the case that each respondent makes all the k(k − 1)/2 possible com-
parisons. The data collected this way can be represented in several kinds of
matrices introduced in the following sections. For each matrix, a condition of
reciprocity is assumed in such a way that the preference of Ai over Aj can be
derived from the preference of Aj over Ai. Moreover, some condition of con-
sistency is assumed which depends on the different meaning of the elements
of the preference matrix.
2.4.1 Tournament Matrix
A simple structure is the so-called tournament matrix (Moon, 1968), a k× k
zero-one matrix T = [tij] with the following property
T + T T = J − I
where I is the identity matrix of order k and J is a k× k matrix of all ones.
Alternatives are compared each other once and tij equals 1 if and only if the
i-th alternative is preferred to the j-th one, and 0 otherwise. In this case,
tij = 1 − tji. Preferences can be read easily through the rows of a tourna-
ment matrix; for example looking at the following matrix T we can easily
conclude that the first alternative is preferred to the other two, the second
one is preferred to the third and the third one is never preferred.
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T =

0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 0

Matrix T is fully transitive. In literature, several measure of transitivity
have been analyzed. Kendall and Babington–Smith (1940) proposed a con-
sistency coefficient based on the number of circular triads detected in matrix
T . A set of judgments may be regarded as more consistent than another
if it includes fewer circular triads. The number of circular triads does not
provide a complete description of the circularity of preferences. It would be
necessary to consider cycles of greater amplitude, as 4- or 5- cycles, but no
simple formula is known for their individuation. Slater (1961) proposed as
a measure of inconsistency the minimum number s of preference reversals,
needed to reach an unambiguous ranking of the alternatives.
Also the maximum eigenvalue, λ1, provides a measure of how much transitive
are the represented preferences. More precisely, defining µ = 2λ1/(k−1), we
have that 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 for every tournament matrix, since 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ (k − 1)/2
(Moon & Pullman, 1970). In particular, in case of perfect transitivity λ1
equals 0 and so does µ. Then, small values of µ correspond to preferences
that are nearly transitive. Large values of µ, on the other side, correspond to
the opposite situation. In the special case of equal row sums, achievable only
for odd k, λ1(T ) equals (k− 1)/2 and µ equals 1. In graph theory language,
in this case, T is called regular tournament. If k is even and half of the row
sums of T equal k/2 and the rest equal (k − 2)/2, then T is called almost
regular.
2.4.2 Generalized Tournament Matrix
If every respondent compares all the alternatives in pairs more than once or
else, if more than one respondent makes all the comparisons independently,
collective preferences can be represented in a generalized tournament matrix
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P = [piij], a k × k matrix that satisfies
P + P ′ = J − I, P ≥ 0
where I is the identity matrix of order k and J is a k × k matrix of all ones
(Moon & Pullman, 1970).
In this case piij represents the probability that Ai is preferred to Aj and it can
be estimated through pij, the number of comparisons in which Ai is preferred
to Aj divided by the total number of performed comparisons, provided there
are no ties. Hence:
• pij = 1/2 indicates indifference between Ai and Aj;
• pij = 1 indicates that Ai is always preferred to Aj;
• pij > 1/2 indicates that Ai is preferred to Aj.
Also in this case, it holds that pij = 1 − pji. Given n respondents, a gener-
alized tournament matrix can be interpreted as the mean of n tournament
matrices representing individual preferences.
For a generalized tournament matrix we can define different degrees of tran-
sitivity. The stochastic transitivity condition holds if, for every triad of
alternatives Ai, Al and Aj, pil ≥ 0.5 and plj ≥ 0.5, imply that pij is greater
than 0.5.
The “strong” stochastic transitivity condition is more stringent. It provides
that, if pil ≥ 0.5 and plj ≥ 0.5, then pij is greater than the maximum of pil
and plj. An intermediate condition is given by the “moderate” stochastic
transitivity which provides that, under the same hypotheses, pij is greater
than the minimum of pil and plj (Coombs, 1958).
Fedrizzi et al. (2007) define a generalized tournament matrix perfectly tran-
sitive if and only if pil = pij +pjl−0.5, ∀i 6= l 6= j = 1, . . . , k. They proposed
a consistency index which takes into account whenever this condition is vio-
lated.
As for tournament matrices, also in this case the maximum eigenvalue, λ1, is
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proportional to internal consistency. Defining µ = 2λ1/(k − 1) (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1),
small values of µ correspond to preferences that are nearly transitive and
large values of µ to the opposite situation (Moon & Pullman, 1970).
2.4.3 Multiplicative Paired Comparison Matrix
Another kind of matrix, widely used in literature (Saaty, 1977, 2008), is the
multiplicative paired comparison matrix M = [mij] in which mij ∈ ]0,+c[
where c ∈]0,+∞[ and
• mij = 1/mji for i, j = 1, . . . , k and i 6= j;
• mii = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k.
A matrix entry mij represents the ratio between Ai and Aj preferences:
mij > 1 implies that Ai is preferred to Aj, whereas mij < 1 expresses the
opposite preference and mij = 1 means indifference.
Saaty proposed the use of the multiplicative paired comparison in the Ana-
lytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a tool to solve multi-criteria decision prob-
lems. The structure of the typical decision problem considered in AHP con-
tains k alternatives and c decision criteria. Each alternative can be evaluated
in terms of the decision criteria and the relative importance of each criterion
can be elicited through pairwise comparisons. The decision-maker has to ex-
press her/his opinion about the value of one single pairwise comparison at a
time, choosing a linguistic option such as Ai is x times more important than
Aj, or Ai is of the same importance as Aj.
A one-to-one mapping between the set of discrete linguistic choices and a
discrete set of numbers representing the importance is defined. According to
the scale introduced by Saaty, the available values for the pairwise compar-
isons are members of the set {9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5, 1/6,
1/7, 1/8, 1/9}.
A multiplicative paired comparison matrix is perfectly transitive if it respects
the multiplicative consistency, that is if mil = mijmjl ∀i 6= j 6= l = 1, . . . , k.
The assumption of the Saaty scale restricts the respondent’s possibility to
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be consistent, in fact if for example mij = 5 and mjl = 3, clearly mil cannot
equals 15. However, Saaty provided a measure of closeness to the consistency
(CI) again in terms of the maximum eigenvalue CI = (λ1−k)/(k−1). Small
values of the index indicate a good level of transitivity. M is fully transitive
if λ1 = k and CI = 0. To determine the goodness of the consistency index,
Saaty proposed to compute the consistency ratio CR given by CR = CI/RI,
where RI is the mean consistency index computed on a sample of randomly
generated matrices using the same matrix dimensionality and scale.
2.4.4 Additive Paired Comparison Matrix
The additive paired comparison matrix D = [dij] is defined as a k×k matrix
in which dij ∈]−∞,∞[ with the following characteristics:
• dij = −dji for i = 1, . . . , k and i 6= j ;
• dii = 0.
MatrixD is such thatD = −DT . In this case each element dij represents the
difference of preference between Ai and Aj. Hence, dij > 0 implies that Ai is
preferred to Aj, dij < 0 implies the opposite preference and dij = 0 implies
indifference. The additive paired comparison matrix is known in algebraic
literature as skew symmetric matrix. An additive paired comparison matrix
is perfectly consistent if and only if dil = dij + djl ∀i, j, l = 1, . . . , k and
i 6= j 6= l. The additive paired comparison matrices are sometimes derived
from large-scale modern internet and e-commerce databases.

Chapter 3
Ranking and Scoring Methods
In this chapter we will describe some popular methods suggested in literature
for ranking and scoring the alternatives starting from a generalized tourna-
ment matrix P . Comparing two alternatives, Ai and Aj, a respondent prefers
Ai to Aj with theoretical probability piij, where 0 ≤ piij ≤ 1 for i, j = 1, . . . , k
and i 6= j. Supposing that n respondents compare all the k(k − 1)/2 pos-
sible pairs independently, piij can be estimated through pij, the proportion
of comparisons in which Ai is preferred to Aj. Each respondent is assumed
to be equally informative. From the quantitative estimates of the preference
relations we want to construct a ranking of the alternatives or define a set of
weights that reflect their relative importance.
For each of the proposed methods we give a brief description and some exam-
ples to better understand how it works. Moreover we consider their reliability
in the cases pij equals either 0 or 1.
3.1 Score Vector
The score vector method (Thurstone, 1927b; Kendall, 1955; David, 1987) is
the simplest way to score the alternatives.
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The score vector ω(1) is the (k × 1) vector of row sums obtained as
ω(1) = P · e
where e is a column vector of 1’s. The score vector method is practicable
even if pij equals either 0 or 1.
For a tournament matrix the i-th row sum represents the number of times
the i-th alternative is preferred to the others, while for a generalized tour-
nament matrix it can be interpreted as the expected score of Ai, that is the
expected number of alternatives the i-th one is preferred to the others.
Let us consider the following fully transitive matrix, T , which represents the
preferences expressed by a respondent who compares every pair of alterna-
tives once.
T =

0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 0

We have that ω(1) = (2, 1, 0)T and the ranking of the alternatives is obviously
A1, A2 and A3, with A1 scoring most.
This ranking agrees with that obtained by the vector of the average probabil-
ity estimates p = (p1., . . . , pk.), whose elements are defined as follows (David,
1988)
pi. =
1
k − 1
∑
j 6=i
pij for i = 1, . . . , k.
In other words, pi. represents the average proportion of comparisons for which
Ai is preferred. In the previous example we have p = (1, 0.5, 0). The sum of
the average probabilities equals (k − 1)/2.
To estimate the score si of the i-th alternative it is possible to use both the
score vector entries and the average probabilities estimates. After being nor-
malized, the estimates sˆi obtained in both cases coincide.
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Consider also the case of intransitive preferences, represented by the follow-
ing matrix T1. It can be associated to the Chinese game of rock (R)-paper
(P)-scissors (S), in which rock breaks scissors, scissors cut paper but paper
covers rock.
T1 =
R S P
R 0 1 0S 0 0 1
P 1 0 0
The score vector of T1 is given by ω
(1) = (1, 1, 1). In this case, it is not
possible to order the alternatives since each of them is preferred the same
number of times. This matrix describes the so called regular tournament in
which, for k odd, all of the row sums equal (k − 1)/2.
To see one more application consider the following generalized tournament
matrix
P1 =

0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.4
0.1 0 0.8 0.8 0.8
0.1 0.2 0 0.7 0.7
0.4 0.2 0.3 0 0.6
0.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0

that represents the situation in which n respondents compare independently
5 alternatives in pairs.
Let us remember that every pij is the proportion of comparisons in which
Ai is preferred to Aj. Looking at this matrix, for example, we can say that,
since p12 = 0.9, 9 out of 10 respondents prefer alternative A1 to A2.
The maximum eigenvalue λ1(P1) equals 1.848 and the inconsistency index
µ = 2λ1/(k − 1) equals 0.924 (Moon & Pullman, 1970). Let us remember
that 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and that small values of µ correspond to near transitive
preferences while large values to the opposite situation. Then, P1 seems
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characterized by low consistency. Considering also the number of 3-cycles,
we have three over the ten possible triads that result circular.
Table 3.1 shows the row-sums, the average probabilities and the ranking
referred to this specific example.
Table 3.1: Row-sums, average probabilities and ranking derived from P1
Alternatives Row-sums Average probabilities Ranking
1 2.8 0.56 1
2 2.5 0.50 2
3 1.7 0.34 3
4 1.5 0.30 4
5 1.5 0.30 4
It may be noticed that, the last two alternatives have the same row sum and,
consequently, the same position in the alternatives’ ranking.
3.2 Eigenvector Method
Another method apt to scoring a set of alternatives is based on the eigen-
decomposition of the generalized tournament matrix P obtained from a
complete paired comparisons experiment in which n respondents compare
k alternatives in pairs. Since P is a positive irreducible matrix, the Perron-
Frobenius theorem guarantees that a unique large real eigenvalue λ1 exists
as solution of the characteristic equation (Keener, 1993)
Pω = λ1ω
and that the corresponding eigenvector ω has strictly positive components.
The principal eigenvector ω is uniquely determined imposing that ‖ω‖2 = 1,
that is the squared entries sum up to 1. The i-th entry of ω is assumed to
represent the relative importance of the i-th alternative and it can be used to
estimate its score. Moreover, alternatives can be ranked according to these
estimates (Horn & Johnson, 1985).
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The idea of using the eigenvector to score is due to Kendall and Wei (Wei,
1952; Kendall, 1955) and the method has acquired new currency today thanks
to web applications. The web search engine Google (www.google.com) uses
a variant of this idea to measure the importance of a large number of web
sites (Brin & Page, 1998).
As we have seen, the i-th entry of the score vector represents the number
of alternatives which the i-th one is preferred to. The score vector ranking,
then, takes into account only the number of preferred alternatives. Kendall
proposed, as suggested by Wei, to use as measures of strength the row sums
of the power of the matrix P . In fact, the i-th entry of ω(2), defined as
ω(2) = P 2e
where e is a vector of all 1’s, is the sum of the scores of all the alternatives
preferred to the i-th one and so it can be considered as another measure of
relative strength. The more an alternative is preferred to other alternatives
with high row sum, the higher the final score of that alternative.
Iterating the reasoning, we can compute
ω(3) = P 3e
and consider this vector as a further measure of relative strength of the alter-
natives since it contains the sums of the sums of the scores of the preferred
alternatives. According to the power method, for m→∞ we have that
ω(m) = Pme
converges to the principal eigenvector ω for P (Mises, 1929).
Let us consider the matrix analyzed in section 3.1 which represents perfectly
transitive preference probabilities
T =

0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 0

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As we have seen, if a matrix is completely transitive, the maximum eigenvalue
λ1 is equal to 0. Moreover, for k ≥ 2, the matrix representing completely
transitive preferences, having tij = 1 if and only if i < j, is reducible and so
it has all the k eigenvalues equal to 0 (De Caen et al., 1992). In this case,
then, the eigenvector method does not provide a meaningful ranking and it
may be more convenient to consider the ranking obtainable from the score
vector.
In the opposite case of completely intransitive preferences represented by the
following matrix
T1 =

0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

the eigen-decomposition returns the maximum eigenvalue λ1 = 1 with asso-
ciated eigenvector ω = (0.577, 0.577, 0.577). Also this method returns tied
rankings. For any value of k, in case of regular tournament matrix, the max-
imum eigenvalue λ1 equals to (k− 1)/2 and ωi = 1/
√
k for i = 1, . . . , k. The
eigenvector method may be applied also if pij equals either 0 or 1.
Let us see in detail what happens applying the eigenvector method to the
matrix P considered in Section 3.1
P =

0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.4
0.1 0 0.8 0.8 0.8
0.1 0.2 0 0.7 0.7
0.4 0.2 0.3 0 0.6
0.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0

In Table 3.2 we report the score vectors of the power of P , each divided by
its Frobenius norm, so as to obtain the same normalization of the eigenvec-
tor. For completeness, we report, in the last column, also the values of the
principal eigenvector ω of P .
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Table 3.2: Normalized score vectors after each iteration of the power method
applied on P
Alternatives ω(1) ω(2) ω(3) ω(4) ω(5) ω(6) ω
A1 0.604 0.620 0.589 0.602 0.601 0.599 0.600
A2 0.539 0.474 0.496 0.497 0.493 0.495 0.494
A3 0.367 0.338 0.362 0.357 0.355 0.3571 0.357
A4 0.324 0.356 0.362 0.354 0.357 0.3568 0.356
A5 0.324 0.386 0.381 0.372 0.377 0.376 0.376
The last two alternatives have the same row sum but they differ from the
second iteration on. The rankings according to the score vector and the
eigenvector methods agree only for the first two positions. As expected, the
eigenvector method weights more A5 than A4, because, despite having the
same row sum, the last alternative has probability 0.6 to be preferred to A1,
the high ranked alternative.
3.3 Linear Models
Another method, well known in the literature, for ranking and scoring the
alternatives is the linear model. The linear paired comparison model (David,
1988) assumes that any of the k alternatives has true rating Vi which can be
used to determine their ordering. The scores of the k alternatives can be rep-
resented on a continuum. Given the ratings of two competing alternatives,
linear models yield the exact probability that one alternative is preferred to
the other. Such probability could, in theory, be verified if the alternatives
were compared a large number of times.
Every respondent evaluates each alternative more than once and her/his
judgment can vary in each replication. The judgment process may be rep-
resented by a continuous variable Yi defined on the real line, with mean Vi,
whose distribution is called “sensation distribution”.
In a pairwise comparison between two alternatives Ai and Aj, Ai is preferred
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to Aj if and only if Yi ≥ Yj. Let us define Zi and Zi − Zj as follows
• Zi = Yi − Vi is a continuous variable with 0 mean and the same distri-
bution as Yi;
• Zi−Zj is a symmetric variable with 0 mean, whose distribution, called
defining distribution, depends on the sensation distribution of Yi (Latta,
1979).
Under linear models hypotheses it is possible to express the preference prob-
ability piij as
piij = Pr[Yi − Yj > 0]
= Pr[Zi − Zj > −(Vi − Vj)]
= FZi−Zj(Vi − Vj).
Starting from an estimated generalized tournament matrix, obtained through
a paired comparison experiment in which n respondents compare all the
possible pairs, the aim is to estimate the true ratings Vi’s (Noether, 1960).
Denoting δij = Vi−Vj we have that piij = F (δij), where F is the distribution
function of a symmetric continuous real variable. Denoting with dij the
estimate of δij, it is possible to estimate Vi’s, solving the following linear
system
dij = Vˆi − Vˆj = F−1Zi−Zj(pij)
where pij, the estimate of piij, is the proportion of comparisons in which the
respondent prefers Ai to Aj.
This linear system has k unknown parameters, the k ratings, and k(k − 1)
equations. So, for k > 3, the system results overdetermined and we need
to impose some contraints to solve it. Since the origin of the linear scale is
arbitrary, David (1988) suggested to impose
k∑
i=1
Vˆi = 0.
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To obtain each Vˆi it is sufficient to sum dij over all j 6= i∑
j 6=i
dij = (k − 1)Vˆi −
∑
j 6=i
Vˆj
= (k − 1)Vˆi + Vˆi −
k∑
j=1
Vˆj
= (kVˆi)
and from this equation it follows that
Vˆi =
∑
j 6=i dij
k
.
Vˆi’s result to be the unweighted least squares estimates of the Vi’s, since they
minimize the following quantity
S =
k∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(dij − (Vi − Vj))2.
Indeed, deriving S with respect Vi we have
δS
δVi
= −2
∑
j 6=i
(dij − Vi + Vj) + 2
∑
j 6=i
(dji − Vj + Vi)
= −4
∑
j 6=i
(dij − δij)
= −4(
∑
j 6=i
dij − kVi)
that, if the derivative is set to 0, gives Vˆi =
∑
j 6=i dij
k
.
3.3.1 Thurstone & Mosteller Model
In the first linear model for paired comparisons by Thurstone (1927c), deci-
sion behaviors are accounted for in probabilistic terms. Consequently, also
apparent inconsistencies are explained in the same terms. According to Thur-
stone’s model, every respondent, when compares two alternatives, chooses the
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one with the greater rating.
The variables Yi’s for i = 1, . . . , k, which model judgments on the i-th alter-
native, are normally distributed.
Thurstone stated different versions of its approach listed below
• CASE I. Only one respondent compares the alternatives more than
once. Yi’s for i = 1, . . . , k are equicorrelated normal variables with
mean Vi, variance σ
2
i and common correlation coefficient ρ;
• CASE II. The assumption in case I of more than one comparison by the
same respondent is generalized such that more respondents compare the
alternatives indipendently. Yi’s (i = 1, . . . , k) are ever equicorrelated
normal variables with mean Vi, variance σ
2
i and common correlation
coefficient ρ;
• CASE III. Thurstone simplified its model assuming that the common
correlation coefficient ρ equals 0. So, the Yi’s are independent variables
with mean Vi and variance σ
2
i ;
• CASE IV. The model is further simplified assuming that the Yi’s vari-
ances are related through the following σi = σj + d for i, j = 1, . . . , k
and i 6= j. Furthermore, d is assumed small;
• CASE V. This corresponds to the most famous version of the Thur-
stone’s model, subsequently reconsidered by Mosteller (Mosteller, 1951),
in which the Yi’s are assumed to be independent normal variables with
mean Vi and common variance σ
2. Under this assumption, the overlap
of the distributions of the two alternatives provides a measure for the
distance between the mean of the alternatives.
In the following, we refer to the Thurstone & Mosteller model meaning the
Thurstone’s model CASE V. So in this case, Zi−Zj has a normal distribution
with 0 mean and variance 2σ2 and
piij = Φ
(
Vi − Vj√
2σ
)
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where Φ is the distribution function of a standard normal variable. From the
previous relation we can estimates the ratings using the relations
dij√
2σ
=
Vˆi − Vˆj√
2σ
= Φ−1(pij)
for i, j = 1, . . . , k and i 6= j.
If pij equals 0 or 1 it is not possible to estimate dij since the inverse of the
standard normal distribution in these points equals, respectively, −∞ and
+∞.
3.3.2 Bradley & Terry Model
Another method for paired comparisons was proposed by Bradley & Terry
(1952) whose main assumption is that
piij =
pii
pii + pij
where pii, for i = 1, . . . , k, is a reparameterization of the true rating Vi of
alternative Ai, such that
∑k
i=1 pii = 1. Imposing that Vi = log(pii), the
Bradley & Terry model can be expressed as a linear model.
Even in this case we assume that n respondents compare the k alternatives
in a complete paired comparison experiment. We replace the normal dis-
tribution, assumed in Thurstone & Mosteller model, with the logistic one.
Following the steps specified for the previous method, assuming i, j = 1, . . . , k
and i 6= j, we have to specify the following assumptions:
• The judgment processes can be represented by continuous independent
random variables Yi’s with Gumbel distribution and parameters (Vi, 1)
which correspond to a mean equalling Vi + γ where γ is the Eulero-
Mascherano constant, and a variance equal to pi2/6;
• Zi = Yi − Vi has a Gumbel standard distribution with mean γ and
variance pi2/6;
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• Zi − Zj results to be a standard logistic variable with mean 0 and
variance pi2/3.
So, we have that
piij = FZi−Zj(Vi − Vj) =
1
2
+
1
2
tanh
(
Vi − Vj
2
)
and inverting the relation
Vi − Vj = 2 arctanh(2piij − 1).
Using the formula atanh(x) = 1
2
ln
(
x+1
x−1
)
we obtain
δij = Vi − Vj = ln
(
piij
piji
)
.
Vˆi’s can be obtained through the following algorithm
Vˆi =
∑
j 6=i
ln
(
pij
pji
)
= ln
∏
j 6=i
(
pij
pji
)
.
The Vˆi’s estimated parameters are such that
∑k
i=1 Vˆi = 0 by construction.
Under the Bradley & Terry reparameterization Vi = log(pii), we get that∑k
i=1 log pii = 0 and
∏k
i=1 pii = 1, and not the Bradley & Terry restriction∑k
i=1 pii = 1. For this reason, it is necessary to make a scale reparametrization
pi′i =
pii∑
pii
.
Also in this case, if pij equals either 0 or 1, it is not possible to estimate Vi,
since log
(
0
1
)
=∞ and log (1
0
)
is undefined.
Likelihood estimation of the Bradley-Terry Model
To estimate the ratings pii of the k alternatives, under the Bradley & Terry
assumptions pii ≥ 0 and
∑
pii = 1, it is possible to use a maximum likelihood
approach.
Because of the indipendence of all comparisons, the probability of observing
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αij preferences for Ai in comparisons with Aj is(
n
αij
)(
pii
pii + pij
)αij ( pij
pii + pij
)n−αij
.
The likelihood function L is the product of such probabilities for any
(
k
2
)
independent pairings and, after some computations, it may be expressed in
terms of the row sums ai as
L = C
∏k
i=1 pi
ai
i∏
i<j (pii + pij)
n
where C =
∏
i<j
(
n
αij
)
and ai =
∑
j αij. Since C is independent of pii’s, we
have that ai’s are sufficient statistics for the pii’s. For any generalized tour-
nament matrix with piij > 0, with i 6= j all the scores are sufficient statistics
under the Bradley & Terry model.
Differentiating logL with respect to pii we obtain the maximum likelihood
estimates pi. They are functions of the ai and do not involve the individual
αij in contrast with what happens fot the estimates of the Vi’s.
We can write the likelihood equations in the form
pi =
ai
n
∑
i<j (pi + pj)
−1
and we find the solutions using an iterative process. Starting with a set of
trial solutions (p
(0)
1 , p
(0)
2 , . . . , p
(0)
k ) we can obtain p
(1)
i , (i = 1, 2, . . . , k) from
p
(1)
i =
ai
n
[
1
p
(0)
i + p
(1)
1
+ · · ·+ 1
p
(0)
i + p
(1)
i−1
+
1
p
(0)
i + p
(0)
i+1
+ · · ·+ 1
p
(0)
i + p
(0)
k
]
and continuing the iterative process until the deviation between p
(r+1)
i and
pri is sufficiently thin. This procedure has a slow convergence.
The pi’s obtained with the maximum likelihood estimates do not add to one
and so they need to be reparameterized. Zermelo (1929) pointed out that the
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ranking achieved by the maximum likelihood estimates is always the same
as that obtained with the score vector method.
3.3.3 Cauchy Model
The Cauchy model assumes that
• Yi’s for i = 1, . . . , k are independent continuous variables with Cauchy
distribution and location and scale parameters, respectively, Vi and σ
2;
• Yi − Vi for i = 1, . . . , k is an independent continuous variable with
Cauchy distribution and location and scale parameters, respectively,
equal to 0 and σ2;
• Zi−Zj for i = 1, . . . , k and i 6= j is an independent continuous variable
with Cauchy distribution and location and scale parameters 0 and 2σ2
respectively. Changing scale, we can say that Zi − Zj has a Student’s
t distribution with 1 degree of freedom.
By these hypotheses we have
piij = FZi−Zj(Vi − Vj) =
1
2
+
1
pi
arctan(Vi − Vj)
from which we obtain
Vi − Vj = tan [pi(piij − 1/2)]
where pi is the pi greek constant.
It is possible to obtain Vˆi, for i = 1, . . . , k, substituting the observed prefer-
ence proportions pij to the theoretical probabilities piij and solving the linear
system under the usual restriction that
∑
Vˆi = 0.
It has to be noted that the event pij = 0 leads to dij = tan
(−pi
2
)
= −∞,
while pij = 1 leads to dij = tan
(
pi
2
)
=∞.
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3.3.4 Uniform Model
The uniform model assumes that Zi−Zj for i = 1, . . . , k and i 6= j are inde-
pendent variables with uniform distribution on the interval
(−1
2
, 1
2
)
. Then,
we have that
piij = F (Vi − Vj) = Vi − Vj + 1
2
from which we can easily obtain
Vi − Vj = piij − 1
2
.
Finally, the estimates of Vi are given by
Vˆi =
1
k
∑
j 6=i
(pij − 1
2
)
=
[
ai − 1
2
n(k − 1)
]
where ai is the row sum associated to the i-th alternative. David (1988)
points out that, from the point of view of estimating the ratings Vi, using
this distribution to model piij is equivalent to using the row sums of P .
3.3.5 Exponential Model
The exponential model assumes that Zi−Zj for i, j = 1, . . . , k and i 6= j are
indipendent variables with standard Laplace distribution, so that
piij = FZi−Zj(Vi − Vj) =
1
2
[1 + sign(Vi − Vj)(1− exp(−|Vi − Vj|))]
from which, supposing without loss of generality that Vi ≥ Vj, we have
Vi − Vj = ln (−2(piij − 1))−1 .
It is possible to obtain the estimate of the Vi’s in the usual way solving the
linear system
dij = Vˆi − Vˆj = 1
2
[1 + sign(Vi − Vj)(1− exp(−|Vi − Vj|))]
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under the constraint that
∑
i Vˆi = 0.
The sensation and defining distributions corresponding to the linear models
just described are summarized in the synoptic Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Sensation and defining distributions of the examined linear models
Model Sensation Distribution Defining Distribution
Thurstone&Mosteller Normal Normal
Bradley& Terry Gumbel Logistic
Cauchy Cauchy Cauchy
Uniform Uniform Triangular
Exponential Exponential Laplace
Chapter 4
Ranking the alternatives: A
simulation study
In the following, we will analyze the methods presented in Chapter 3 for
ranking or scoring the alternatives, starting from a generalized tournament
matrix P = [pij], obtained from a paired comparison experiment in which
n respondents compare the k alternatives in pairs. We assume that every
respondent performs all the k(k − 1)/2 possible comparisons.
The analysis of matrix P allows to estimate the relative position of the al-
ternatives on a continuum, as well as their ranks. Scoring methods attribute
a numerical value to each alternative, which quantifies their relative impor-
tance. Ranking methods intend to capture the ordinal aspects by assigning
a rank to the alternatives, ignoring quantitative information on how much
an alternative is important relatively to the others.
To perform the comparison between the methods, we will rely on properties
of ranking. For this purpose, we have performed some simulation studies
using various data generation systems. In particular, we used two different
approaches: simulating directly the matrices (Section 4.1) and starting from
the random variables that model the preference relations under the linear
model hypotheses (Section 4.2).
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4.1 Simulating Typical Matrices
4.1.1 Random Matrices
First of all, we generated randomly some generalized tournament matri-
ces. For every k × k matrix P we obtained k(k − 1)/2 observations x =
(x1, . . . , xk(k−1)/2) from a continuous uniform variable X ∼ U(0, 1). These
values compose the upper triangular block of P , whose entries pij are such
that i < j and j = 2, . . . , k. The lower triangular block is computed using
the relation pji = 1−pij. So, each matrix is obtained according to the scheme
represented in P .
P =

0 x1 x2 x3 ... ... xk−1
1− x1 0 xk xk+1 ... ... ...
1− x2 1− xk 0 ... ... ... ...
1− x3 1− xk+1 ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... 0 xk(k−1)/2
1− xk−1 ... ... ... ... 1− xk(k−1)/2 0

We computed the rankings, respectively, with
• the score vector method (SV);
• the eigenvector method (EV);
• the linear models: Thurstone & Mosteller (T&M), Bradley & Terry
(B&T), Cauchy (CAU), Uniform (UNI), Exponential (EXP)
and we studied the association between the rankings obtained with the dif-
ferent methods by means of the Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation ρ.
Defining ymi the rank of the i-th alternative according to the method m, for
every couple of methods m and n we have
ρmn =
∑
i(ymi − y¯m)(yni − y¯n)√∑
i(ymi − y¯m)
∑
i(yni − y¯n)
with i = 1, . . . , k.
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The Rank-Order Correlation coefficient ρ can take values between −1 and
1; ρ equals 1 if the rankings are in perfect agreement, ρ = −1 if they are in
perfect disagreement and ρ = 0 signifies that there is no relationship (Spear-
man, 1904).
This step is performed just for exploratory purposes, so to understand which
methods give similar results. However, the method least correlated with the
others could be the more reliable method.
In the following we present the mean values of Spearman’s correlation coeffi-
cients between the rankings obtained with the different methods over n = 500
replications for some values of k, in particular k = (8, 16, 24).
Table 4.1: Mean Spearman’s correlation coefficient, ρ¯, for n = 500 replica-
tions and k = 8 (s.e. in parenthesis)
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
SV – 0.954 0.945 0.917 0.667 1.000 0.925
– (0.047) (0.066) (0.088) (0.241) (0.000) (0.082)
EV – – 0.920 0.893 0.647 0.954 0.902
– – (0.080) (0.098) (0.252) (0.047) (0.092)
T&M – – – 0.983 0.782 0.945 0.955
– – – (0.028) (0.176) (0.066) (0.055)
B&T – – – – 0.823 0.917 0.951
– – – – (0.154) (0.088) (0.055)
CAU – – – – – 0.667 0.773
– – – – – (0.241) (0.170)
UNI – – – – – – 0.925
– – – – – – (0.082)
As expected (See Table 4.1), the ranking obtained with the score-vector
method corresponds to that obtained with the uniform linear model. The
method least correlated with the others is the Cauchy linear model. The
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Table 4.2: Mean Spearman’s correlation coefficient, ρ¯, for n = 500 replica-
tions and k = 16 (s.e. in parenthesis)
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
SV – 0.977 0.960 0.933 0.590 1.000 0.945
– (0.016) (0.029) (0.049) (0.193) (0.000) (0.038)
EV – – 0.947 0.921 0.583 0.977 0.932
– – (0.032) (0.051) (0.190) (0.016) (0.041)
T&M – – – 0.988 0.717 0.960 0.969
– – – (0.012) (0.151) (0.029) (0.022)
B&T – – – – 0.766 0.933 0.965
– – – – (0.129) (0.049) (0.024)
CAU – – – – – 0.590 0.719
– – – – – (0.193) (0.142)
UNI – – – – – – 0.945
– – – – – – (0.038)
highest mean value of the Spearman’s correlation coefficients, ρ¯, is between
the Thurstone & Mosteller and the Bradley & Terry methods (ρ¯ = 0.983).
Also the eigenvector and the score vector methods are highly correlated
(ρ¯ = 0.954).
We highlight that, while increasing k, results substantially do not change
(See Tab. 4.2). The correlations between the Cauchy and the other rank-
ings further decrease, while all the correlations among the rankings obtained
with the other methods increase. The highest averages of Spearman’s corre-
lation coefficients are between the Thurstone & Mosteller and the Bradley &
Terry methods (ρ¯ = 0.988) and between the eigenvector and the score vector
methods (ρ¯ = 0.977).
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Table 4.3: Mean Spearman’s correlation coefficient, ρ¯, for n = 500 replica-
tions and k = 24 (s.e. in parenthesis)
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
SV – 0.986 0.963 0.939 0.524 1.000 0.950
– (0.009) (0.020) (0.033) (0.170) (0.000) (0.029)
EM – – 0.956 0.932 0.520 0.986 0.943
– – (0.023) (0.035) (0.174) (0.009) (0.031)
T&M – – – 0.991 0.660 0.963 0.976
– – – (0.007) (0.138) (0.020) (0.013)
B&T – – – – 0.711 0.939 0.973
– – – – (0.123) (0.033) (0.014)
CAU – – – – – 0.524 0.668
– – – – – (0.170) (0.131)
UNI – – – – – – 0.950
– – – – – – (0.029)
Table 4.3 shows the mean values of Spearman’s correlation coefficients be-
tween the rankings obtained with the different methods over n = 500 repli-
cations for k = 24. The results confirm the findings obtained with the other
values of k considered.
4.1.2 First Raw Dominant Matrices
Consider the case in which the set of k alternatives can be partitioned in two
classes I and J such that each alternative in I is preferred to every alterna-
tive in J by more than 50% of the respondents (pij > 0.5 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J).
In order for the resulting ranking to be consistent, each member of I should
also be preferred to any member of J .
In the particular case in which only the first alternative belongs to the class
I while the others belong to J , we should expect that a good ranking method
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would place the earliest alternative at the first place, since it is always pre-
ferred to the others. In many practical contexts the first objective in eliciting
preferences from a sample of respondents is to identify the best alternative.
For this reason the examination of this particular situation is crucial.
To analyze the behavior of the proposed ranking methods, we simulated some
generalized tournament matrices imposing that the elements of the first row
be greater than 0.5. We imposed the first alternative as the always preferred,
just for representation convenience. We could bring any matrix with an alter-
native dominant to this just permuting the rows and columns of the matrix
itself.
So, for each matrix, we obtained k − 1 observations u = (u1, . . . , uk−1) from
a continuous uniform variable U ∼ U(0.5, 1) that constitute the first domi-
nant row. The other elements x = (x1, . . . , x(k−1)(k−2)/2) of the upper trian-
gular block of the matrix are obtained from a continuous uniform variable
X ∼ U(0, 1). The lower triangular matrix can be filled using the relation
pji = 1− pij. P shows the fill pattern of each simulated matrix
P =

0 u1 u2 ... ... ... uk−1
1− u1 0 x1 x2 ... ... ...
1− u2 1− x1 0 ... ... ... ...
... 1− x2 ... 0 ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... 0 xt
1− uk−1 ... ... ... ... 1− xt 0

whith t equals (k − 1)(k − 2)/2.
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As an example, let us consider the following matrix P1
P1 =

0.00 0.75 0.85 0.82 0.86 0.66 0.83 0.93
0.25 0.00 0.18 0.99 0.32 0.38 0.58 0.58
0.15 0.82 0.01 0.72 0.55 0.16 0.43 0.05
0.18 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.46 0.68 0.88
0.14 0.68 0.45 0.74 0.00 0.17 0.66 1.00
0.34 0.62 0.84 0.54 0.83 0.00 0.03 0.04
0.17 0.42 0.57 0.32 0.34 0.97 0.00 0.62
0.07 0.42 0.95 0.12 0.00 0.96 0.38 0.00

The first alternative results dominant since p1j ≥ 0.5 ∀j = 2, . . . , 8, while
the other rows are obtained completely at random. Rankings achieved from
matrix P1 are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Ranking obtained with the different methods applied to matrix
P1
Alternatives SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
A1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
A2 4 5 3 3 2 4 3
A3 7 6 6 6 5 7 6
A4 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
A5 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
A6 5 3 5 5 6 5 5
A7 3 4 4 4 4 3 4
A8 6 7 7 7 7 6 7
In this specific example all the methods but the Cauchy one classify alterna-
tive A1 as first.
We simulated 500 matrices for different values of k = (8, 16, 24) and we
computed the rankings obtained with the different methods. Then, for each
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Table 4.5: Proportion of first alternative well classified for each method for
n = 500 replications and k = 8, 16, 24
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
k=8 0.962 0.978 0.914 0.882 0.444 0.962 0.968
k=16 0.984 0.988 0.968 0.954 0.208 0.984 0.994
k=24 1 1 0.994 0.986 0.170 1 1
method, we computed the proportion of trials in which alternative A1 ranked
first (Table 4.5).
The Cauchy method has again the worst performance with very low pro-
portions of always preferred alternative classified as first and the eigenvector
method is the best performer. Increasing k, the matrix dimensionality, all
the methods improve their performance except the Cauchy one that aggra-
vates its results. Among the linear models, the exponential one shows the
best performance. For k = 24 some methods recognize, in all the performed
replications, the always preferred alternative at the first position. In partic-
ular, we are referring to the score vector and the eigenvector methods and
the uniform and exponential linear models.
In order to better detecting the ability of the considered methods in recogniz-
ing the dominant alternative, we allowed the probability of preferring the first
alternative to vary. We simulated some matrices imposing that the elements
of the first row are greater than a treshold t with t=(0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9). So,
for each matrix we obtained k− 1 observations from the continuous uniform
variable U2 ∼ U(t, 1) that constituted the first dominant row, while the other
elements of the upper triangular block of the matrix were obtained at random
as before. The lower triangular matrix is filled using the relation pij = 1−pji.
We simulated n = 500 matrices for each value of t. In Figure 4.1 we can ob-
serve the resulting proportion of well classified first alternative, on the y-axis,
for different values of the treshold t (on the x-axis). Three values of k are
considered (8, 16, 24).
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Figure 4.1: Proportions of first alternative well classified for each method for
n = 500 replications and different values of the treshold t
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Increasing the treshold probability t all the methods improve their perfor-
mance. For example, for k = 8 and t ≥ 0.7 all the methods but the Cauchy
one classify the first alternative A1 as the best alternative in all the repli-
cations. Cauchy method deserves a separate discussion, since it is the only
method whose performance deteriorates as k, the matrix dimensionality, in-
creases and that for high values of t does not achieve satisfactory results.
Among the others, eigenvector method seems to have the best performance
and the Bradley & Terry approach the worst.
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4.1.3 Strictly Ordered Matrices
Now we consider the case in which alternative A1 is preferred to all the oth-
ers, alternative A2 is preferred to all the alternatives but A1, alternative A3 is
preferred to all the alternatives but A1 and A2, and so on. In this situation,
the consistent ranking should be from first to last A1, A2, . . . , Ak. Indeed, for
a ranking to be consistent, if pij is greater than 0.5, alternative Ai should be
ranked higher than Aj.
For each matrix we obtain k(k − 1)/2 observations u = (u1, . . . , uk(k−1)/2)
from a continuous uniform variable U ∼ U(0.5, 1). These elements will con-
stitute the upper triangular block of the matrix while the corresponding lower
triangular matrix is filled using the relation pji = 1− pij. P shows how such
a matrix is constructed.
P =

0 u1 u2 ... ... ... uk−1
1− u1 0 uk uk+1 ... ... ...
1− u2 1− uk 0 ... ... ... ...
... 1− uk+1 ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... 0 uk(k−1)/2
1− uk−1 ... ... ... ... 1− uk(k−1)/2 0

Just as an example, consider the following matrix P1
P1 =

0.000 0.508 0.645 0.900 0.898 0.780 0.656 0.842
0.492 0.000 0.937 0.656 0.867 0.616 0.742 0.746
0.355 0.063 0.000 0.736 0.670 0.775 0.696 0.723
0.100 0.344 0.264 0.000 0.835 0.504 0.831 0.640
0.102 0.133 0.330 0.165 0.000 0.910 0.870 0.907
0.220 0.384 0.225 0.496 0.090 0.000 0.973 0.996
0.344 0.258 0.304 0.169 0.130 0.027 0.000 0.894
0.158 0.254 0.277 0.360 0.093 0.004 0.106 0.000

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The upper triangular matrix elements are all greater than 0.5. Table 4.6
shows the corresponding rankings.
Table 4.6: Ranking obtained with the different methods applied to matrix
P1
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
A1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
A2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2
A3 3 3 4 4 6 3 3
A4 4 4 6 6 5 4 5
A5 5 6 5 5 4 5 6
A6 6 5 3 3 1 6 4
A7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
A8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
As we can see, in this example, only the Cauchy ranking method does not put
A1 in the first position. More in general only the score vector and the uniform
linear model recognize the consistent ranking A1, A2, . . . , Ak. We compute
the Spearman correlation coefficients between the rankings obtained with the
different methods and the consistent ranking. Spearman’s ρ treats all ranks
equally, to give more importance to top ranks than lower ones, we computed
also a weighted version of the Spearman’s ρ correlation coefficient, named rw
(Pinto da Costa & Soares, 2005) given by
rw = 1− 6
∑
i(ymi − yni)(2k − ymi − yni + 2)
k4 + k3 − k2 − k
where ymi and yni are the i-th ranks obtained respectively with method m
and n. This correlation coefficient weights ranks in proportion to how high
they are, assuming that the higher rank is 1, and that it corresponds to
the best element in the ranking. The weighted correlation coefficient rw
can take values in the range [−1, 1]; rw equals 1 if the rankings are same,
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rw = −1 if they are in perfect disagreement and rw = 0 indicates that there
is no relationship. Table 4.7 shows the weighted and unweighted correlation
coefficients referred to this example.
Table 4.7: Spearman’s ρ and weighted correlation coefficient rw between
ranking methods and “true” ranking obtained for matrix P1
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
ρ 1 0.976 0.833 0.833 0.548 1 0.929
rw 1 0.981 0.836 0.836 0.468 1 0.937
The score vector method and the uniform linear model are perfectly corre-
lated. Among the others, the method most correlated with the consistent
ranking is the eigenvector (ρ = 0.976, rw = 0.981) and the least correlated
method is once again the Cauchy model (ρ = 0.548, rw = 0.468).
To understand better the behavior of the ranking methods in the hypothized
situation, we performed 500 simulations for different values of k, in particular
k = 8, 16, 24. For each matrix, we computed the rankings with the different
methods and we measured the correlation between these rankings and the
“consistent” ranking (Tables 4.8, 4.9, 4.10).
Table 4.8: Mean Spearman’s ρ¯ and mean weighted correlation coefficient, r¯w,
between ranking methods and true ranking over 500 replications and k = 8
(s.e. in parenthesis)
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
ρ¯ 0.954 0.942 0.926 0.914 0.738 0.954 0.957
(0.037) (0.046) (0.054) (0.061) (0.152) (0.037) (0.037)
r¯w 0.954 0.952 0.926 0.914 0.740 0.954 0.958
(0.040) (0.038) (0.060) (0.067) (0.158) (0.040) (0.040)
All the methods but Cauchy provide good results, with mean correlation and
mean weighted correlation coefficients larger than 0.9. Also in this case, then,
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Cauchy model has the worst performance. Among the more consistent meth-
ods, the exponential linear model is the most correlated with the consistent
ranking. The weighted correlation coefficient does not change substantially
the results.
Table 4.9: Mean Spearman’s ρ¯ and mean weighted correlation coefficient, r¯w,
between ranking methods and true ranking over 500 replications and k = 16
(s.e. in parenthesis)
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
ρ¯ 0.974 0.966 0.957 0.947 0.733 0.974 0.974
(0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.110) (0.012) (0.014)
r¯w 0.974 0.974 0.957 0.947 0.734 0.974 0.974
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.121) (0.013) (0.015)
Increasing k, all the methods improve their results, except the Cauchy linear
model which aggravate its results. The methods most correlated with the
consistent ranking are the score vector and the eigenvector methods and the
uniform and exponential linear models.
Table 4.10: Mean Spearman’s ρ¯ and mean weighted correlation coefficient r¯w,
between ranking methods and true ranking over 500 replications and k = 24
(s.e. in parenthesis)
SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
ρ¯ 0.982 0.976 0.970 0.964 0.741 0.982 0.982
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.087) (0.007) (0.007)
r¯w 0.982 0.982 0.970 0.964 0.741 0.982 0.982
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.093) (0.008) (0.008)
Considering all the k values, only for the eigenvector method, the weighted
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correlation coefficient registers a slight improvement compared to the Spear-
man’s ρ.
4.2 Simulating the Yi’s
Linear models assume that every alternative Ai (i = 1, . . . , k) has a true
merit Vi which determines its position in their ranking. In a complete bal-
anced paired comparison experiment n respondents perform their compar-
isons indipendently. So, for each alternative, the judgment process can be
represented by a continuous variable Yi with mean Vi. We would like to check
whether the ranking methods are affected by the distribution of the Yi’s, for
i = 1, . . . , k or by the closeness of the alternatives.
For this purposes, we simulated Vi’s from a uniform distribution Ut ∼ U(0, t)
where t = (4, 3, 2, 1), so that the larger t is, the more the alternatives should
be spaced. Then we obtained Yi’s from different distributions (Normal, Gum-
bel, Cauchy, Uniform and Exponential) and assuming as centrality parame-
ters the Vi’s. We describe more in detail the used procedure in the following:
• We simulated k = 8 values from a uniform variable U ∼ U(0, t). The
values, sorted in decreasing order, constitute the true ratings Vi’s of
the k alternatives. Thus V1 is the highest rating and the associated
alternative A1 should be ranked first;
• For each alternative Ai, i = 1, . . . , k, we obtained n = 100 replications
from a continuous variable Yi with normal distribution, mean Vi and
unit variance;
• Each matrix element pij is obtained as aij/n where aij is the number
of times Yi is greater than Yj in the simulated sample;
• We get m = 500 matrices following the above procedure. For each of
them we computed the rankings based on the selected methods;
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• For each method, we computed ρ¯ and r¯w, the mean values of Spear-
man’s and the mean weighted correlation coefficients, between the cor-
responding ranking and the “true ranking”, by construction, A1, . . . , Ak;
• This procedure is reiterated changing the distribution of Yi at point
two of the list.
4.2.1 Normal Distribution
Table 4.11 shows the mean values of Spearman’s correlation, ρ¯, and weighted
correlation coefficients, r¯w, computed over 500 replications using the proce-
dure already explained. Vi’s values for i = 1, . . . , 8 are obtained from a
uniform variable Ut ∼ U(0, t). Yi’s are normally distributed with mean Vi
and unit variance.
Table 4.11: Mean Spearman’s, ρ¯, and mean weighted correlation coefficient,
r¯w, for Yi ∼ N (Vi, 1) (s.e. in parenthesis)
t SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
4
ρ¯ 0.978 0.976 0.974 0.972 0.957 0.978 0.973
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.048) (0.030) (0.033)
r¯w 0.978 0.977 0.974 0.973 0.958 0.978 0.973
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.054) (0.030) (0.034)
3
ρ¯ 0.968 0.967 0.967 0.966 0.959 0.968 0.964
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.049) (0.037) (0.039)
r¯w 0.968 0.967 0.966 0.966 0.959 0.968 0.964
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.055) (0.041) (0.043)
2
ρ¯ 0.947 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.944 0.947 0.944
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.060)
r¯w 0.948 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.945 0.948 0.946
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061)
1
ρ¯ 0.882 0.881 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.882 0.871
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.116)
r¯w 0.886 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.886 0.875
(0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.106) (0.115)
The closer the alternatives, decreasing t, the larger the difficulties of meth-
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ods in identifying the true ranking. The weighted version of the correlation
coefficient gives substantially the same results. Anyhow, all methods provide
rankings highly correlated with the true ranking and results which are very
similar.
4.2.2 Gumbel Distribution
Let us assume Yi’s are continuous variables with a Gumbel distribution, with
parameters (Vi, 1) which correspond to a mean equalling Vi+γ, where γ is the
Eulero-Mascherano constant, and a variance equal to pi2/6. The mean values
of Spearman’s correlation coefficients, ρ¯, and the mean values of weighted
correlation coefficients, r¯w, between the rankings obtained with the examined
methods and the true ranking are presented in Table 4.12. As previously, we
consider different values of t = 4, 3, 2, 1 and k = 8.
Table 4.12: Mean Spearman’s ρ¯ and mean weighted correlation coefficient r¯w
for Yi ∼ Gum(Vi, 1) (s.e. in parenthesis)
t SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
4
ρ¯ 0.974 0.970 0.971 0.970 0.959 0.974 0.972
(0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.046) (0.031) (0.034)
r¯w 0.975 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.963 0.975 0.973
(0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.033) (0.036)
3
ρ¯ 0.964 0.962 0.963 0.962 0.957 0.964 0.960
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
r¯w 0.965 0.963 0.964 0.963 0.959 0.965 0.960
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.047) (0.042) (0.044)
2
ρ¯ 0.943 0.941 0.942 0.942 0.941 0.943 0.941
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.058)
r¯w 0.944 0.943 0.943 0.943 0.942 0.944 0.941
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.064)
1
ρ¯ 0.867 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.861
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.110)
r¯w 0.869 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.861
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.115)
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As the closeness among the alternatives increases, all the methods worsen
their performance. We do not observe substantial differences in the results
from the normal assumption case (Table 4.11), but a slight deterioration
appears for all methods.
4.2.3 Cauchy Distribution
Table 4.13 shows the mean values of Spearman’s correlation coefficients, ρ¯,
and the mean values of weighted correlation coefficients, r¯w, computed over
500 replications obtained following the usual procedure. In this case Yi are
continuous variables with a Cauchy distribution, location parameter Vi and
scale parameter 1.
Table 4.13: Mean Spearman’s ρ¯ and mean weighted correlation coefficient r¯w
for Yi ∼ Cau(Vi, 1) (s.e. in parenthesis)
t SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
4
ρ¯ 0.949 0.949 0.947 0.947 0.942 0.949 0.948
(0.053) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056)
r¯w 0.949 0.951 0.948 0.947 0.942 0.949 0.949
(0.057) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
3
ρ¯ 0.936 0.936 0.935 0.934 0.933 0.936 0.937
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058)
r¯w 0.935 0.937 0.934 0.934 0.933 0.935 0.937
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.062)
2
ρ¯ 0.894 0.892 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.894 0.893
(0.095) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.094)
r¯w 0.896 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.896 0.895
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.096)
1
ρ¯ 0.778 0.778 0.777 0.777 0.778 0.778 0.770
(0.165) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.168)
r¯w 0.779 0.778 0.777 0.777 0.778 0.779 0.770
(0.173) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.173) (0.177)
As the alternatives get closer, both the unweighted and the weighted correla-
tion coefficients decrease. With respect the other distribution assumptions,
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we can globally observe lower values of both the correlation coefficients.
4.2.4 Uniform Distribution
Table 4.14 shows the mean of Spearman’s correlation coefficients, ρ¯, and
the mean values of weighted correlation coefficients, r¯w, obtained over 500
replications for k = 8 and different values of t. Yi’s are assumed to be
continuous variables with a uniform distribution, mean Vi and unit variance.
Table 4.14: Mean Spearman’s, ρ¯, and mean weighted correlation coefficient,
r¯w, for Yi ∼ U(Vi, 1) (s.e. in parenthesis)
t SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
4
ρ¯ 0.977 0.977 0.976 0.975 0.967 0.977 0.976
(0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.044) (0.033) (0.034)
r¯w 0.977 0.977 0.976 0.975 0.967 0.977 0.976
(0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.049) (0.037) (0.037)
3
ρ¯ 0.968 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.961 0.968 0.965
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
r¯w 0.968 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.961 0.968 0.965
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
2
ρ¯ 0.950 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.947 0.950 0.946
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.050) (0.054)
r¯w 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.949 0.947 0.950 0.947
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.058)
1
ρ¯ 0.878 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.878 0.873
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.102)
r¯w 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.876 0.877 0.873
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.106)
Also in this case, as the closeness of the alternatives increases, both corre-
lation coefficients decrease. We obtained for both the mean of Spearman’s
correlation coefficients, ρ¯, and weighted correlation coefficients, r¯w, values
close to those obtained in simulations conducted under the assumptions of,
respectively, Normal and Gumbel distributions (Tables 4.11, 4.12) and better
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than the case of assumed Cauchy distribtion (Table 4.13).
4.2.5 Exponential Distribution
Suppose Yi has assumed exponential distribution with mean Vi and vari-
ance V 2i . The variance is not constant for all Yi’s, (i = 1, . . . , k) but it is
proportional to the mean, by hypothesis.
Table 4.15: Mean Spearman’s ρ¯ and mean weighted correlation coefficient r¯w
for Yi ∼ Exp(1/Vi) (s.e. in parenthesis)
t SV EV T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP
4
ρ¯ 0.938 0.939 0.933 0.931 0.904 0.938 0.933
(0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.078) (0.109) (0.072) (0.075)
r¯w 0.925 0.927 0.919 0.916 0.883 0.925 0.921
(0.088) (0.088) (0.091) (0.095) (0.133) (0.088) (0.090)
3
ρ¯ 0.945 0.946 0.940 0.937 0.911 0.945 0.940
(0.062) (0.063) (0.068) (0.071) (0.106) (0.062) (0.064)
r¯w 0.935 0.937 0.928 0.925 0.892 0.935 0.930
(0.076) (0.076) (0.082) (0.085) (0.127) (0.076) (0.077)
2
ρ¯ 0.942 0.943 0.938 0.935 0.909 0.942 0.938
(0.068) (0.067) (0.070) (0.072) (0.102) (0.068) (0.071)
r¯w 0.931 0.932 0.925 0.921 0.889 0.931 0.925
(0.085) (0.082) (0.088) (0.090) (0.124) (0.085) (0.089)
1
ρ¯ 0.936 0.938 0.933 0.929 0.900 0.936 0.931
(0.079) (0.080) (0.078) (0.082) (0.113) (0.079) (0.088)
r¯w 0.924 0.925 0.919 0.915 0.877 0.924 0.918
(0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.100) (0.138) (0.096) (0.106)
Differently from the other assumed distributions, all ranking methods were
not affected by the closeness of the alternatives. All methods provided good
results with mean values of Spearman’s correlation coefficients, ρ¯ ≥ 0.9 for all
t values and methods (Table 4.15). The mean values of weighted correlation
coefficients, r¯w, provide slight worse results.

Chapter 5
Estimation of Missing Values in
a Matrix
In a paired comparison experiment alternatives are presented in pairs to re-
spondents, who have to indicate the one they like most. Given a set of k
alternatives A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak}, the results of these evaluations can be
naturally recorded in a k× k matrix, in which the (i, j) entry represents the
outcome of the comparison between Ai and Aj. As we have seen, there are
various kinds of matrices suitable for this purpose.
When respondents do not compare directly two alternatives, the matrix
designated to represent their preferences is characterized by one or more
missing values. The topic of missing values in a preference matrix has
been extensively discussed in literature (Harker, 1987; Carmone et al., 1997;
Kwiesielewicz & Van Uden, 2003; Fedrizzi & Giove, 2007).
In the following section we analyze the main reasons for which some compar-
isons may be missing.
5.1 Possible Causes of Missing Observations
In Dittrich et al (2012) authors identify six specific types of scenarios that
can cause missing data in paired comparison experiments. In the following
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we will analyze each of the proposed causes.
1. Missing paired comparisons by design. In a completely balanced paired-
comparison experiment, respondents have to compare all possible pairs
of alternatives. Indeed, for k alternatives, each respondent have to
compare k(k−1)/2 pairs of alternatives so that, increasing k, the num-
ber of required comparisons increase exponentially. For instance, in
a full complete design, for k = 4, respondents compare 6 pairs while
k = 15 provides 105 paired comparisons. If k is large, this technique
is unapplicable, that is why received criticism from several researchers
(Kendall & Babington-Smith, 1940; David, 1988; Fabbris, 2013). Each
respondent has to perform an excessive number of comparisons which
leads to an increase of the response error because of respondent’s fa-
tigue. To contain this problem, it is necessary to reduce the number
of required comparisons by design. The researcher will choose which
comparisons have to be performed and which other not.
2. Respondents may not complete the paired comparison experiment,
since for different reasons, for instance fatigue or information overload,
s/he has to interrupt the procedure after completing only a portion
of the paired comparison tasks. Also this situation is motivated by
the excessive number of comparisons, but in this case the respondent
chooses which comparisons avoiding.
3. The researcher prematurely halts the paired comparison experiment for
a particular respondent, since he judges s/he not to take the experiment
seriously. We state that the actual problem, in this situation, are not
the missing values but the given responses, thought of as improper.
4. Respondent fails to answer to a comparison due to his/her insufficient
knowledge of the alternatives being compared. This can happen, for
example, when highly technical objects are being compared. Also in
this case the matter is how to consider the given responses, since the
respondent is considered unreliable.
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5. Respondents are unable to compare two alternatives since they cannot
distinguish among them. This outcome is likely if two objects are
equally preferred, and there is no “no preference” possibility in the
response set.
6. The respondent has made a preference choice, but s/he knows that the
choice can be socially disapproved and s/he is reluctant to express that
preference. An example would be preferring a far right political party
to a mainstream party.
Missing data can be classified in three different categories (Schafer & Gra-
ham, 2002). Data can miss completely at random (MCAR) if a missing
observation for an individual cannot depend either on the value of other
dected variables nor on any observed or missing response. Missing data are
defined at random (MAR) if a missing observation can depend on the value
of the other variables and on observed responses made, but not on the value
that would have been observed. Finally, missing are not at random (MNAR)
if the missing observation also depends on the value that would have been
observed.
Under this classification hypotheses, missing paired comparisons by design
can be considered completely at random, since the missing data mechanism
is determined before the data collection. The second and third cases, of early
interruption of the experiment, can be considered missing at random, as miss-
ing data depend on the performed comparisons. Also the fourth scenario is
missing at random, since missing data depend on respondents’ knowledge.
Finally, the last two cases are missing not at random as missing observations
depend on the responses that would be given.
5.2 Estimating the Missing Values
Consider the case in which n respondents elicit, independently of each other,
their preferences on a set of k alternatives using paired comparisons. Data
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collected can be naturally represented in a generalized tournament matrix
P = [pij], a k × k matrix whose elements pij can be viewed as the propor-
tions of comparisons in which the i-th alternative Ai is preferred to the j-th.
Respondents’ preferences are collected in order to determine a ranking or to
define a system of weights that reflect the relative importance of the alter-
natives.
Computerized questionnaires can insist on a respondent to answer a question,
so as missing data from the last two scenarios can be avoided. Moreover, data
collected on unreliable respondents, or with insufficient knowledge about the
alternatives, can be at all not considered. The main cause of missing data,
then, remains the excessive number of pairwise comparisons, which occur
increasing k, the number of alternatives. Mathematical constraints impose a
minimum of only k−1 comparisons to establish the ranking for k attributes,
but paired comparisons methods use k(k − 1)/2 comparisons. To semplify
the procedure, the number of required comparisons may be reduced so as to
be between k − 1 and k(k − 1)/2.
In the following sections, we propose two methods to estimate the missing
cells in a generalized tournament matrix P , within which cells are missing
by design. First, we analyze an estimation method associated with the linear
models. Then, we propose a procedure based on the minimization of the sum
of the singular values of P .
5.3 Composition Rules for Linear Models
The linear paired comparison model (David, 1988) assumes that each of the k
alternatives has true rating Vi which can be used to determine their ordering.
We are considering the case in which n respondents evaluate the alternatives
independently. The judgment process may be represented by a continuous
variable Yi with mean Vi whose distribution is called “sensation distribution”.
In a pairwise comparison between two alternatives Ai and Aj, Ai is preferred
to Aj if and only if Yi ≥ Yj. So, each preference probability piij represents the
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probability that Yi is greater than Yj and it can be estimated through pij,
the proportion of comparisons in which Ai is preferred to Aj. Let us define
Zi and Zi − Zj as follows
• Zi = Yi − Vi is a continuous variable with zero mean and the same
distribution as Yi;
• Zi − Zj is a symmetric variable with zero mean, whose distribution,
called defining distribution, depends on the sensation distribution of Yi
(Latta, 1979).
We have immediately that piij = FZi−Zj(Vi−Vj), where F is the distribution
function of Zi − Zj.
When respondents do not compare directly two objects, Ai and Aj, linear
models permit to estimate the preference relation between them using the
information achieved from their comparison with a shared alternative Al. In
practice, it is possible to obtain pˆij through pil and plj for i, j, l = 1, . . . , k
and i 6= j 6= l.
The function which relates pˆij with pil and plj, called composition rule, may
be written in a general form as
pˆij,l = G(pil, plj).
For values of pil and plj ∈ (0, 1), G(pil, plj) ∈ [0, 1]. So, under linear models
assumptions we have (Latta, 1979)
pˆij,l = Pr (Yi ≥ Yj) = F (Vi − Vj)
= F (Vi − Vl + Vl − Vj)
= F [F−1(pil) + F−1(plj)]
= G(pil, plj).
5.3.1 Composition Rules’ Properties
In Latta (1979) composition rules are formally defined and several properties
are presented. In the following we list the main ones.
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• In generalized tournament matrices pij = 1− pji. Then, since
pˆij,l = G(pil, plj)
pˆji,l = G(pjl, pli) = G(1− plj, 1− pil)
we have that G(pil, plj) = 1−G(1− plj, 1− pil) for pil, plj ∈ (0, 1) and
i 6= l 6= j = 1, . . . , k.
• From the previous property it follows that, for pil ∈ (0, 1)
G(pil, 1− pil) = 1−G(1− pli, 1− pil)
= 1−G(pil, 1− pil)
=
1
2
• Consider a tern of probability estimates pij, pjl, pil with i, l, j = 1, . . . , k
and i 6= l 6= j. Each of them can be expressed as function of the others
through the composition rules as follows
pˆij,l = G(pil, 1− pjl)⇔ pˆil,j = G(pij, pjl)⇔ pˆjl,i = G(1− pij, pil)
Proof of the above property is available in Latta (1979).
• From the last two properties we obtain that, for plj ∈ (0, 1)
G
(
1
2
, plj
)
= pˆlj
G
(
plj,
1
2
)
= pˆlj
Indeed, let us suppose without loss of generality that
pˆij,l = G
(
1
2
, plj
)
.
Then, by previous property
G(pij, pjl) =
1
2
from which we obtain pij = 1 − pjl = plj. Second equality is proved
similarly.
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• Composition rules are symmetric, monotonic and continuous functions.
• Since G(pil, plj) is a monotonic function and G
(
1
2
, plj
)
= pˆlj, we have
that if pil and plj are greater than
1
2
then G(pil, plj) is greater than the
maximum of pil and plj. For the same reason, if pil and plj are smaller
than 1
2
then G(pil, plj) is smaller than their minimum.
These last two properties are particularly meaningful, as they show
that linear models’ composition rules follow the strong transitivity con-
dition. Let us remember that, for a generalized tournament matrix, we
can define different degrees of transitivity. We constate that the strong
stochastic transitivity condition holds if, for every triad of alternatives
Ai, Aj and Al, if pil ≥ 0.5 and plj ≥ 0.5, then pij is greater than the
maximum of pil and plj (Coombs, 1958).
Thurstone & Mosteller Model
Under the Thurstone & Mosteller model assumptions, (Thurstone, 1927c;
Mosteller, 1951) pij can be estimated using pil and plj through the following
formula
pˆij,l = Φ
[
Φ−1(pil) + Φ−1(plj)
]
where Φ is the distribution function of a standard normal variable.
Bradley & Terry Model
Bradley & Terry model (1952) assumes that F is the distribution function
of a standard logistic variable, that is
F (x) =
1
2
+
1
2
tanh
(x
2
)
.
Inverting this relation we have
F−1(p) = ln
(
p
1− p
)
.
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So the corresponding composition rule is
pˆij,l = F
(
ln
(
pil
1− pil
)
+ ln
(
plj
1− plj
))
=
1
2
+
1
2
tanh
(
1
2
ln
(
pilplj
(1− pil)(1− plj)
))
=
1
2
+
1
2
exp
{
1
2
ln
(
pilplj
(1−pil)(1−plj)
)}
− exp
{
−1
2
ln
(
pilplj
(1−pil)(1−plj)
)}
exp
{
1
2
ln
(
pilplj
(1−pil)(1−plj)
)}
+ exp
{
−1
2
ln
(
pilplj
(1−pil)(1−plj)
)}
=
1
2
+
1
2
pilplj − (1− pil)(1− plj)
pilplj + (1− pil)(1− plj)
=
pilplj
pilplj + (1− pil)(1− plj) .
Cauchy Model
Cauchy model assumes that F is the distribution function of a Student’s T
variable with 1 degree of freedom. Since
F (x) =
1
2
+
1
pi
arctan(x)
the corresponding composition rule is given by
pˆij,l = F (F
−1(pil) + F−1(plj))
= F (tan(pi(pil − 1/2)) + tan(pi(plj − 1/2))
=
1
2
+
1
pi
arctan
[
tan
(
pi pil − pi
2
)
+ tan
(
pi plj − pi
2
)]
.
Latta (1979) suggests to equale pˆij,l to 1 if
√
2(1− pil) +
√
2(1− plj) ≤ 1.
Uniform Model
Suppose F is the distribution function of a continuous uniform variable
U ∈ (−1
2
, 1
2
)
so that
F (x) = x+
1
2
.
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The corresponding composition rule results
pˆij,l = F (F
−1(pil) + F−1(plj))
= F (pil − 1
2
+ plj − 1
2
)
= pil + plj − 1
2
.
Latta (1979) proposed the following composition rule for the uniform model:
pˆij,l = pil + plj − 3
2
+
√
2(1− pil) +
√
2(1− plj)− 2
√
(1− pil)(1− plj)
if pil ≥ 1
2
, plj ≥ 1
2
and
√
2(1− pil) +
√
2(1− plj) ≥ 1
= pil − plj − 1
2
+
√
2plj −
√
2(1− pil) + 2
√
plj(1− pil)
if 1 > pil ≥ 1− plj ≥ 1
2
.
Latta’s composition rule is only partially defined. In the following cases
• pil, plj ≤ 12 ;
• 1− plj ≥ pil ≥ 12 ;
• pil ≤ 1− plj ≤ 12 ;
• 1− plj ≤ pil ≤ 12
it can be constructed using the following property
G(pil, plj) = 1−G(1− plj, 1− pil). (5.1)
Exponential Model
The Exponential model assumes that F is the distribution function of a
standard Laplace variable. Since
F (x) =
1
2
(1 + sign(x)(1− exp−|x|))
we have that
F−1(p) = −sign
(
p− 1
2
)
ln
(
1− 2
∣∣∣∣p− 12
∣∣∣∣) .
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The resulting composition rule is
pˆij,l = 1− 2(1− pil)(1− plj) if pil ≥ 1
2
, plj ≥ 1
2
= 1− 1
2
(
1− pil
plj
)
if pil ≥ 1− plj ≥ 1
2
.
Similarly to the uniform model, the composition rule of the exponential model
is only partially defined and can be reconstructed using property 5.1.
5.4 Rank Minimization Problems
Matrix completion problems have received a great deal of attention in the
algebraic literature (Laurent, 2001; Lee & Seol, 2001; Cravo, 2009). These
kind of problems arise in a variety of applications, such as statistics, chem-
istry and systems theory. Matrix completion issue tries to answer whether
a given partial matrix can be completed according to specified rules. For
example, the positive definite completion problem asks which partial Her-
mitian matrices have a positive definite completion. A variety of matrix
properties have been studied. Laurent (2001) considers the following matrix
completions: positive (semi)definite matrices, distance matrices, completely
positive matrices, contraction matrices and matrices of given rank.
Rank matrix completion problems are concerned with determining whether
or not a partial matrix can be completed so that its rank is maximized or
minimized. Searching for the completion which minimizes the rank of the
matrix corresponds, intuitively, to complete the matrix with values that best
fit the observed data.
Our aim is to recover an incomplete generalized tournament matrix P which
represent the preference relations among a set of k alternatives. Preference
data could be modeled through factor models, which assume that only a very
small number of factors influences the preferences. Computationally, factor
models are equivalent to low rank approximation of the matrix of observed
data. So, assuming that only a few dimensions contribute to individual pref-
erences, our goal is to produce a low-rank matrix that respects the observed
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elements of P or at least minimizes the deviation from them.
Unfortunately, the rank minimization problem is unsolvable and all known
algorithms that provide an exact solution require a computing time doubly
exponential in the dimension k of the matrix in both theory and practice
(Chistov & Grigor’ev, 1984).
Let us present a recent heuristic introduced by Fazel et al. (2001), that min-
imizes the nuclear norm ‖P ‖∗ over the constraint set. The nuclear norm,
also known as “trace norm”, is defined as
‖P ‖∗ =
k∑
i=1
σi.
where σi for i = 1, . . . , k are the singular values of P , defined in the following
section.
5.4.1 Singular Value Decomposition
Given a k × k generalized tournament matrix P , the singular value decom-
position is a factorization of the form
P = UΣV T
where U is a k×k real unitary matrix, such that U tU = UU t = I, where I
is the identity matrix, Σ is a k×k diagonal matrix with nonnegative elements
on the diagonal and V T is another k × k real unitary matrix. We name the
diagonal entries σi of Σ as the singular values of P , the k columns of U and
V are respectively the left-singular and the right-singular vectors of P . The
singular value decomposition and the eigen-decomposition of a matrix are
closely related. Namely:
• The left-singular vectors of P are eigenvectors of PP T ;
• The right-singular vectors of P are eigenvectors of P TP ;
• The non-zero-singular values of P , found on the diagonal entries of
Σ are the square roots of the non-zero eigenvalues of both P TP and
PP T .
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Nuclear Norm Minimization
Assuming that the generalized tournament matrix P we want to recover can
be well approximated by a low-rank matrix, we consider the missing entries
in P as variables x1, . . . , xp and we obtain them by minimizing the nuclear
norm as a function of these variables. To give an example consider the fol-
lowing 4 × 4 matrix P1 which represents a paired comparison experiment
performed by n respondents on 4 alternatives. Let us suppose that indi-
viduals make 11 of the 12 possible comparisons. Supposing, without loss of
generality, that the comparison between the first and the fourth alternative
was not performed, P has two missing entries which correspond to positions
(1, 4) and (4, 1).
P =

0 p12 p13 x1
1− p12 0 p23 p24
1− p13 1− p23 0 p34
1− x1 1− p24 1− p34 0

Hence, we wish to recover the data matrix by solving the following optimiza-
tion problem
minimize ‖X‖∗
subject to xij = pij (i, j) ∈ Ω
X +XT = J − I
where P is the matrix expected to recover, X is the matrix after recovering
and Ω is the set of positions corresponding to the observed entries, that is
(i, j) ∈ Ω if pij is observed. Moreover, J is a square matrix of all 1’s and
I is the identity matrix and the second constraint sets the structure of a
generalized tournament matrix.
The values that minimize the nuclear norm are not necessarily those that
minimize the rank, but they are consistent with the hypothesis of a good
approximation of a low-rank matrix. Indeed, it can be shown that the rank
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of a generalized tournament matrix P of order k is either k or k−1 (Brualdi,
2006).
The nuclear norm is a convex function, which can be optimized efficiently. It
is the best convex lower approximation of the rank function over the set of
matrices with spectral norm less than or equal to one. Intuitively, while rank
counts the number of nonvanishing singular values, nuclear norm sums their
amplitude. In case of symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix, nuclear
norm minimization is equivalent to the trace minimization, the trace of a
positive semidefinite matrix being the sum of its singular values.
Nuclear norm minimization is often used to recover a matrix from a sam-
ple of its entries, provided the matrix is low-rank or approximately low-
rank (Cande`s & Recht, 2009). Applications include dimensionality reduction
(Linial et al., 1995; Weinberger & Saul, 2004), inference with partial infor-
mation (Rennie & Srebro, 2005). Rank minimization plays a key role in the
study of embeddings of discrete metric spaces in Euclidean space (Donoho &
Tanner, 2005). In some applications, such as sensor localization, the matrix
has exactly low rank, i.e., only the top few of its singular values are nonnull.
However, the matrix can be full rank, and well approximated by a low-rank
matrix.
Differently from the case in which observed entries are selected at random
and no information is available about the matrix to be recovered, we know
that diagonal elements of a generalized tournament matrix P are ever equal
to 0. Moreover, we have to consider that if p comparisons are missing, then
the matrix P contains 2p unknown elements, due to the reciprocity condition
pij = 1− pji.
5.5 The Single Missing Comparison Case
Let us assume that only the entry that defines the preferability between
alternatives Ai and Aj, i 6= j, is missing. Then pij and pji = 1 − pij are
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unknown in the k× k matrix P . Consider the simple case represented in the
following matrix according to which A1 is preferred to A2 and A2 is preferred
to A3, while nothing is known about the preferability between A1 and A3.
P1 =

0 1 x
0 0 1
1− x 0 0

For preferences to be internally consistent, alternative A1 should be preferred
to A3, and then, x should be equal to 1. In Fig 5.1 it is represented the
nuclear norm of P1 for x ∈ [0, 1]. As we can see, the nuclear norm reaches
its minimum, as expected, if x = 1.
Figure 5.1: Nuclear norm of P1
Suppose otherwise that, matrix P2 represents the situation in which both
A1 and A3 are absolutely preferred to A2. In this case, it is not possible to
express a forecast on the preference relation between A1 and A3.
P2 =

0 1 x
0 0 0
1− x 1 0

Also in this case, we represent the nuclear norm for x ∈ [0, 1] (See Fig. 5.2).
As we can see, ‖P2‖∗ reaches its minimum in x = 0.5, which means that it
is impossible to express a preference in any direction.
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Figure 5.2: Nuclear norm of P2
5.5.1 Comparison between Composition Rules and Nu-
clear Norm Minimization
To better understand the nuclear norm minimization procedure, we com-
pare, via simulation, its behavior with linear models’ composition rules.
Just to give an example, consider the following matrix P3, representing a
paired comparison among 4 alternatives, obtained assuming Yi’s normally
distributed with mean Vi’s ∈ (0, 1) and unit variance. In particular, given
V = (0.46, 0.60, 0.75, 0.88), we get
P3 =

0.00 0.47 0.44 0.36
0.53 0.00 0.44 0.40
0.56 0.56 0.00 0.44
0.64 0.60 0.56 0.00
 .
To verify the different methods reliability, we simulate the darkening of p14,
and of its symmetric entry p41 = 1 − p14, and we try to estimate p14 as if
they were missing.
Linear models permit to estimate pij using the information achieved from the
comparison ofAi andAj with a shared alternativeAl with i 6= j 6= l = 1, . . . , k.
So, in this case, we can estimate the preference relation between A1 and A4
using the information achieved from their comparisons with, respectively, A2
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and A3. So, it is possible obtain pˆ14,l through the following
• pˆ14,2 = G(p12, p24);
• pˆ13,4 = G(p13, p34).
The final estimate of pij is the mean of all the possible estimates pˆij,l with
i 6= j 6= l = 1, . . . , k
pˆij =
1
k − 2
∑
l 6=i,j
pˆij,l.
In this specific example, the estimate of p14 is given by
pˆ14 =
1
2
(pˆ14,2 + pˆ14,3) .
Finally, p14 is estimated through the nuclear norm minimization procedure
(NNM), imposing p14 = x and solving the usual optimization problem
minimize ‖X‖∗
subject to xij = pij (i, j) ∈ Ω
X +XT = J − I
where P3 is the matrix we would recover, X is the matrix once recovered
and Ω is the set of positions corresponding to the observed entries, that is
(i, j) ∈ Ω if pij is observed. The second constraint imposes that p12 = 1−p21.
Among the linear models, we consider the following
• Thurstone & Mosteller (T & M)
• Bradley & Terry (B & T)
• Cauchy (CAU)
• Uniform (UNI)
• Exponential (EXP)
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Table 5.1: p14 estimates
T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP NNM
pˆ14 0.376 0.377 0.379 0.385 0.382 0.375
Table 5.1 shows the pˆ14 obtained with the examined estimation methods.
Once estimated the missing entries, to evaluate their goodness, we can com-
pute the mean square error, defined as
MSE = E[(p14 − pˆ14)2].
Table 5.2 shows the mean square error referred to this specific example. As
we can see, the nuclear norm minimization provides good results, even better
than the Thurstone & Mosteller linear model, although P3 was created under
its assumptions.
Table 5.2: Mean square errors of pˆ14
T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP NNM
MSE 0.00027 0.00028 0.00035 0.00060 0.00047 0.00023
To extend our considerations, we obtained 500 matrices assuming different
distributions for the Yi’s and k = 8. The simulation scheme is described as
follows:
• We simulated k = 8 values from a uniform variable U ∼ U(0, 1);
• For each alternative Ai, i = 1, . . . , k, we obtained n = 100 replica-
tions from a continuous variable Yi with normal distribution, centrality
parameters Vi and unit variance;
• Each matrix element pij is obtained as aij/n where aij is the number
of times Yi is greater than Yj in the simulated sample;
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• We get m = 500 matrices following the above procedure;
• The procedure is iterated considering other values of k and different
distributions for the Yi’s (Normal, Gumbel, Cauchy, Uniform and Ex-
ponential).
• The specific assumptions for each assumed distribution are the same
as those described Section 4.2.
For each matrix, a cell at a time is assumed missing and its estimate is ob-
tained through the linear models’ composition rules and the nuclear norm
minimization. Then, for each method, we computed the mean square error
over all the 500 replications. Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 show the results obtained
assuming respectively k = 8, 16, 24. In the first column the assumed distri-
bution is specified.
Table 5.3: Mean square errors of pˆij over 500 replications and k = 8 (s.e. in
parenthesis)
Distribution T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP NNM
Normal
0.00123 0.00123 0.00127 0.00127 0.00126 0.00125
(0.00207) (0.00208) (0.00212) (0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00209)
Gumbel
0.00107 0.00107 0.00111 0.00111 0.00112 0.00106
(0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00154) (0.00157) (0.00154) (0.00148)
Cauchy
0.00113 0.00113 0.00114 0.00112 0.00115 0.00113
(0.00159) (0.00159) (0.00160) (0.00159) (0.00162) (0.00158)
Uniform
0.00105 0.00105 0.0011 0.00109 0.00109 0.00106
(0.00146) (0.00146) (0.00151) (0.00150) (0.00149) (0.00150)
Exponential
0.00125 0.00136 0.00288 0.00306 0.00176 0.00254
(0.00196) (0.00227) (0.00475) (0.01447) (0.00295) (0.00363)
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Table 5.4: Mean square error of pˆij over 500 replications and k = 16 (s.e. in
parenthesis)
Distribution T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP NNM
Normal
0.00086 0.00086 0.00088 0.00092 0.00088 0.00090
(0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00121) (0.00129) (0.00121) (0.00128)
Gumbel
0.00092 0.00092 0.00096 0.00094 0.00096 0.00093
(0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00145) (0.00143) (0.00147) (0.00142)
Cauchy
0.00099 0.00099 0.00099 0.00101 0.00099 0.00100
(0.00127) (0.00127) (0.00125) (0.00128) (0.00126) (0.00128)
Uniform
0.00080 0.00080 0.00085 0.00088 0.00085 0.00081
(0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00108) (0.00116) (0.00108) (0.00105)
Exponential
0.00096 0.00101 0.00226 0.00229 0.00131 0.00216
(0.00132) (0.00150) (0.00368) (0.01396) (0.00197) (0.00338)
Table 5.5: Mean square error of pˆij over 500 replications and k = 24 (s.e.
in parenthesis)
Distribution T&M B&T CAU UNI EXP NNM
Normal
0.00083 0.00083 0.00087 0.00091 0.00087 0.00086
(0.00122) (0.00122) (0.00129) (0.00134) (0.00129) (0.00125)
Gumbel
0.00101 0.00101 0.00103 0.00104 0.00104 0.00106
(0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00136) (0.00139) (0.00137) (0.00138)
Cauchy
0.00094 0.00094 0.00094 0.00095 0.00095 0.00094
(0.00133) (0.00133) (0.00135) (0.00136) (0.00135) (0.00133)
Uniform
0.00088 0.00088 0.00090 0.00093 0.00091 0.00092
(0.00134) (0.00134) (0.00135) (0.00139) (0.00136) (0.00138)
Exponential
0.00100 0.00101 0.00210 0.00292 0.00127 0.00148
(0.00151) (0.00150) (0.00339) (0.01201) (0.00194) (0.00257)
The nuclear norm minimization provides very similar results to linear mod-
els composition rules. These results are meaningful, especially considering
that in these analyses matrices are simulated starting from the same assump-
tions as linear model. The composition rules associated to the Thurstone &
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Mosteller and the Bradley & Terry linear models provide the same results,
except for the assumed Exponential distribution. As k increases, we can not
observe any regularity in the results. The composition rule associated to the
Thurstone & Mosteller linear model seems to be the best method to estimate
missing values in a generalized tournament matrix, in case of one missing ob-
servation and data generated under linear model assumptions. However it
could be interesting to compare linear models’ composition rules and nuclear
norm minimization in case of two or more missing entries and on real data.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The first aim of this thesis was to compare methods based on distributional
parametric hypotheses with methods that do not require such hypotheses.
For this reason, some simulation studies have been performed and the re-
sults analyzed. We are now able to state that the Cauchy model is the only
ranking method characterized by an unreliable behavior. In fact, in the case
of first raw dominant matrices it is characterized by very low proportions
of always to-be-preferred alternative classified as first. For strictly ordered
matrices, the Cauchy model is again the least correlated with the consistent
ranking.
With regard to the other methods, they give similar outcomes. These results
are confirmed also by considering the correlations between the examined
ranking methods for random matrices. The method least correlated with the
others is always the Cauchy linear model while all the remainings are highly
correlated. However, we can observe slight differences among other models.
The eigenvector method, for instance, is the best performer in identifying
the dominant alternative, for all considered values of k and of to-be-preferred
probability. The exponential linear model provides reliable estimates in case
of strictly ordered matrices.
We notice that the eigenvector and the score-based ranking methods, which
do not require any distributional assumption, give results very similar to
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linear models, even when matrices are generated under the linear models as-
sumptions.
We can finally affirm that the effectiveness of the examined methods does
not depend on the assumed distribution.
Hence, apart from the advice to avoid the Cauchy model, the choice of the
ranking method depends essentially on the researcher’s objectives. If the
goal is to get only a ranking of the alternatives, we advise to use the eigen-
vector method. On the other hand, linear models can be used to describe
the relationship between the preference probabilities and some explainatory
variables, such as personal characteristics of the respondents, useful for the
estimation of individual data.
It was not possible to compare the different methods for scoring purposes,
since scores obtainable with the score vector and the eigenvector methods
are expressed on a different scale than linear models.
We proposed a method to estimate missing values within a generalized tour-
nament matrix. This method is based on the minimization of the nuclear
norm. It assumes that only a few dimensions contribute to individual pref-
erences and searches for values that appraise and respect the valid elements
of the matrix, minimizing the deviation from them.
Some simulations are performed to compare the nuclear norm minimization
rule with the composition rules associated to linear models. The nuclear
norm minimization provides results similar to composition rules. These re-
sults are meaningful, especially considering that in these analyses matrices
are simulated starting from the same assumptions as linear model.
For further research, it would be interesting to compare composition rules
and the nuclear norm minimization extending the comparison to two or more
missing entries and larger matrices. In particular, it would be important to
study whether the examined methods are affected by a larger proportion of
missing entries within a generalized tournament matrix.
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